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JUdiciaL foreiGN reLaTioNS aUThoriTY afTer 9/11
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations 
towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and 
punctually done by one national government . . . .
 . . . .
 [U]nder the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the law of 
nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner . . . . The 
wisdom of the convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of 
courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government cannot be too much 
commended.1
 Sometimes the most popular persons and ideas in their day are the ones that are 
least remembered in ours. So it has gone for John Jay. When he agreed to join with 
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton to contribute to what are now known as 
The Federalist Papers, he was by far the most prominent of the three.2 Jay had already 
served as the president of the Continental Congress, devoted a year as minister to 
Spain, helped negotiate the Treaty of Paris that ended the Revolution, and was 
concluding his tenure as secretary of foreign affairs. He would, among other things, 
go on to become the first Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court while at the same 
time continuing his role as the nation’s foremost diplomat, negotiating the 
controversial treaty that bore his name.3 Before he was sidelined by illness, Jay was to 
be the senior partner among the three who constituted “Publius.”4 Today he is barely 
remembered for having taken part at all.
 Things have gone the same way with the ideas that Jay, and his coauthors, 
thought central to the Federalist project. Jay wrote four of the first five essays to 
appear in the series, and each of these addressed the proposed Constitution’s likely 
benefits in foreign relations. Adding Hamilton’s initial contributions, the first nine 
essays reference foreign affairs in some significant way. The initial point that Publius 
sought to convey was that the Constitution would strengthen the national government 
in ways that were essential for the nation’s “security for the preservation of peace and 
tranquility, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers 
of the like kind arising from domestic causes.”5 For Jay and Hamilton especially, a 
crucial component for the maintenance of national security would be an independent 
1. The Federalist No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. Walter Stahr, John Jay: Founding Father, at xiii (2005).
3. For a recent biography, see Stahr, supra note 2. For a classic account of the negotiations for the Treaty 
of Paris ending the Revolution, see Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers 
and American Independence (1965).
4. The others, more famous today, were of course Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. “Publius” was 
the name chosen by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay as the authors of all Federalist Papers published between 
1787 and 1788. The name honors a Roman Consul named Publius Valerius Publicola, who was one of 
the founders of the Roman Republic. See The Federalist (Publius) (J. & A. McLean 1788).
5. The Federalist No. 3, supra note 1, at 42.
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federal judiciary. Hamilton, among other things, argued not just that the federal 
courts properly should resolve cases under treaties and the law of nations, but even 
domestic law cases involving foreigners.6 For his part, Jay rested his position on his 
experience as among the most distinguished diplomats among the Founders.
 Two hundred years later, the Founders’ vision has become even more compelling. 
Modern developments in international relations yield a whole new set of reasons for 
the courts to play a prominent and independent role in foreign affairs matters. As 
leading scholarship agrees, a commonplace result of globalization in its various forms 
is an erosion of traditional national sovereignty.7 This phenomenon in part results 
from subunits of governments interacting with one another, as various regulators or 
judges of a given nation team up with their foreign counterparts.8 Less well considered 
is which parts of a government benefit from this process relative to others. But by 
any reckoning, the net winner is far and away the executive.9 So clear is the executive’s 
comparative advantage that it puts still more pressure on the idea of separated, 
balanced government branches, which the Founders assumed would be a core feature 
of the government they were establishing. In this way, the domestic effects of 
globalization merely work to further augment the steady growth in presidential 
power relative to Congress and the courts over the past two centuries. Even sixty 
years ago, this escalation had already prompted Justice Jackson to declare that even 
though executive power might eclipse balanced, democratic institutions, “it is the 
duty of the Court to be the last, not first, to give them up.”10 Together, a renewed 
appreciation for the Founding along with the most current insights of international 
relations analysis should make the Justice’s alarm, if anything, more ominous than 
the wartime setting in which he made it.
 Yet what should be consensus on the courts’ foreign affairs role has never faced 
greater challenge. Instead, a dubious wisdom extolling judicial deference threatens to 
become conventional. In a variety of contexts, less cosmopolitan successors of the 
first Chief Justice have called for the judiciary to refrain from “say[ing] what the law 
is”11 when doing so would implicate the foreign policy goals of the other branches. 
First occasionally, then with greater consistency, various federal judges have argued 
for judicial deference to Congress and above all to the President on a range of issues, 
including the interpretation of treaties, statutes, and the Constitution; the use of 
international and comparative law to constrain government actors; and the 
determination of whether a case is justiciable in the first place. Judge Brett Kavanaugh 
of the D.C. Circuit captured the spirit of this growing line of thinking in declaring 
that “[I]n our constitutional system of separated powers, it is for Congress and the 
6. The Federalist No. 80, at 476–77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
7. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. 
Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 World Pol. 39 (1974).
8. See Slaughter, supra note 7.
9. See infra Part II.
10. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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President—not the courts—to determine in the first instance whether and how the 
United States will meet its international obligations.”12 Yet even this expression of 
judicial isolationism pales next to its academic counterpart. Various academics have 
for years advocated that so far as foreign relations go, the courts that adjudicate least 
adjudicate best.13 The most insistent voice for this position far and away has been the 
tireless John Yoo.14 As he puts it, courts limiting the President’s ability to take urgent 
national security measures constitutes an “Imperial Judiciary at War,” not with the 
nation’s enemies but with the Constitution’s ostensible command to permit the 
executive branch to respond to foreign threats unchecked by the courts.15
 For a time the forces of judicial isolationism appeared to have gained traction and 
may yet carry the day. It is all the more surprising, then, that the Supreme Court 
reasserted the judiciary’s traditional foreign affairs role in the areas in which its 
opponents assert deference is most urgent—national security, terrorism, and war. Yet 
so far, in every major case arising out of 9/11, the Court has rejected the position 
staked out by the executive branch, even when supported by Congress. At critical 
points, moreover, each of these rejections involved the Court reclaiming its primacy 
in legal interpretation, an area in which advocates of judicial deference have appeared 
to make substantial progress. The Court nonetheless rejected deference in statutory 
construction in Rasul v. Bush.16 It took the same tack with regard to treaties in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.17 It further rejected deference in constitutional interpretation in 
both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld18 and Boumediene v. Bush.19 Together, these cases represent a 
stunning reassertion of the judiciary’s proper role in foreign relations. Whether 
reassertion will mean restoration, however, still remains to be seen.
 This essay sketches the foundations for assuring that restoration, an undertaking 
that offers a firmer basis for the Court’s 9/11 jurisprudence. Part II will consider the 
doctrine of judicial deference, which threatens, partly successfully and partly not, to 
remove the judiciary from its proper role in foreign relations. Part III begins a critique 
of the deference doctrine by returning to separation of powers fundamentals, 
especially as understood at the Founding. As John Jay suggests, the Founders 
generally believed that the judiciary should be a full player in the separation of powers 
12. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 12 (2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
13. Id. at 11–12 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
14. Professor Yoo has collected his ideas in a de facto trilogy. John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: 
The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11 (2005); John Yoo, War by Other Means: 
An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror (2006); John Yoo, Crisis and Command: The 
History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush (2009).
15. See generally John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2005–2006 CATO Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 83.
16. 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
17. 548 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2006).
18. 542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2004).
19. 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008).
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framework, including foreign relations.20 Among other things, this expectation 
meant the courts should interpret the law—including international law—without 
deference to the President or Congress, even when the nation’s foreign policy was at 
stake. Part IV demonstrates that current developments in international relations 
make the Founding design more vital, not less. Globalization, along with typical 
responses to global terror, represent new forces accelerating the comparative growth 
of executive authority throughout the world, not least in the United States. The 
resulting imbalance of power makes the need for an independent judicial check, if 
anything, more critical now than it was originally, above all in foreign relations. Part 
V builds upon these foundations to supplement the rationales that the Court offered 
in its principal 9/11 decisions. In particular, this section argues that the Court rightly 
afforded the President zero deference when interpreting statutes, treaties, and 
constitutional provisions. This essay concludes that the Court should draw upon 
both original understanding and international relations to solidify its recent 
reassertion of its proper role in foreign relations cases.
ii. JUdiCiaL dEfErEnCE tO thE EXECUtiVE in fOrEign rELatiOns
 A. Hamdan versus Sanchez-Llamas
 The Supreme Court’s recent foreign relations cases suggest the apparent growing 
judicial deference toward the executive in foreign relations has reached a stalemate, 
or at least a muddle. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 21 for example, indicates the doctrine 
of judicial deference is alive and well. There the Court agreed with the President 
that the Vienna Consular Convention did not require an exclusionary rule to 
safeguard the treaty’s right of an arrested foreign national to consult with the consular 
officials of his or her nation.22 Among other things, the majority based its decision 
on the contention that the executive’s own interpretation of the Convention was 
owed “great weight.”23 Even Justice Breyer in dissent made clear his agreement with 
the “great weight” formulation.24
 By contrast, in 9/11 cases such as Hamdan, deference was conspicuous by its near 
total absence. Hamdan required the Court to interpret Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 as incorporated by Congress25 in the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ).26 On this point the administration vigorously put forward 
the novel and radical argument that Common Article 3 could not apply to alleged 
20. See The Federalist No. 3, supra note 1.
21. 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
22. Id. at 355–56.
23. Id. at 355.
24. Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25. 548 U.S. 557, 567. For an assessment of the case, see Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: 
Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Executive “Creativity,” in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
2005–2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 51.
26. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950 (2006).
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members of al-Qaeda because the “Global War on Terror” was by definition 
international, whereas the treaty provision applied only to “‘armed conflict not of an 
international character . . . .’”27 Justice Stevens’s opinion of the Court made short 
work of this contention, properly holding that the treaties’ text, structure, and history 
all indicate that the protections of Common Article 3 apply as the baseline in any 
armed conflict.28 The opinion rejects the President’s position, moreover, without any 
indication that it is doing so notwithstanding a presumption that the executive’s 
interpretation is owed substantial weight. The Court’s failure to mention this 
presumption, even if overcome in this case, becomes all the more striking given 
Justice Thomas’s reliance on the doctrine in dissent.29
 The opinions and citations in these cases nonetheless make several matters clear. 
First, foreign relations deference is of relatively recent vintage, a fact that tends to 
undermine several conventional justifications. Second, the doctrine remains 
effectively contested. Finally, the doctrine appears in numerous contexts. Directly 
(Sanchez-Llamas) and indirectly (Hamdan), the cases and their accompanying citations 
center on deference in treaty interpretation. But similar possibilities for deference to 
the executive appear in a range of foreign relations areas. These include interpretation 
of federal statutes implicating foreign affairs;30 interpretation and application of 
customary international law;31 recognition of foreign governments;32 state secrets;33 
and use of the political question doctrine,34 among others. The following analysis 
will focus on treaty interpretation as a window into the current state of the deference 
doctrine more generally.
 A glance at the citations in Sanchez-Llamas and Hamdan suggests that the 
doctrine has a surprisingly recent pedigree. Recent work by professor David Sloss 
confirms that the foreign relations deference was neither present at the creation of 
the republic, nor evident for a long period thereafter.35 In the nation’s first fifty years 
under the Constitution, the Supreme Court applied nothing less than a “zero 
27. See Brief for Respondents at 48, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 292, at **88 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316). 
28. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–32.
29. Compare id. at 635 (stating assumptions made by the majority, of which deference to the executive is not 
included), with id. at 678–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (affirming a “well-established duty” to defer to 
executive interpretations in reference to the military and foreign affairs).
30. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005).
31. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
32. See, e.g., Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 
1999).
33. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); David 
Rudenstine, The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case (1996).
34. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
35. David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 497, 498–99 (2007).
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deference” approach to the executive when interpreting treaties.36 At points, the 
Court even enunciated a duty not to defer.37 For that matter, the executive concurred. 
In response to French entreaties that he intervene on behalf of France, then secretary 
of state Edmund Randolph replied:
The courts of justice exercise the sovereignty of this country in judiciary 
matters, are supreme in these, and liable neither to control nor opposition 
from any other branch of the Government . . . . For, if the President were 
even to decide that a prize ought not to be prosecuted in our courts, the 
decision would be treated as an intrusion by those courts, and the judicial 
proceedings would go on notwithstanding. So speak the constitution and the 
law.38
For its part, the Court guarded the Constitution and the law jealously. Justice 
Johnson, though dissenting, expressed the Justices’ common view, declaring, “[T]he 
views of the administration, are wholly out of the question in this Court. What is the 
just construction of a treaty is the only question here. And whether it chime in with 
the views of the Government or not, this individual is entitled to the benefit of 
construction.”39 As professor Sloss shows, of nineteen cases during this period in 
which the U.S. government was a party, the government lost fourteen and won only 
three, with two effectively split.40 In fact, the first signs of an obligation to defer do 
not appear until the late nineteenth century.41 Even then, those signs remained few 
and far between for almost a century thereafter. It remains the case that no more 
than a handful of decisions actually mention a requirement to defer, and most of 
these do little more than allude to the idea in passing.42 For all the attention deference 
receives, its actual application remains surprisingly meager.
 This paucity in turn suggests that the constitutional bases for the idea are likewise 
modest. Deference hardly seems compelled by text. To the contrary, the Supremacy 
Clause’s conversion of treaties into federal law points to a zero deference approach. 
Nor does original understanding offer any support. Instead, early U.S. sources point 
in just the opposite direction. As will be seen, structural analysis might offer 
justifications for deference given the President’s institutional advantages in conducting 
foreign affairs. Yet the Article III values, articulated by Randolph and Johnson, cut 
just the other way and have carried the day for much of the nation’s history. In terms 
of conventional interpretation, the best possible remaining basis for deference is 
36. See id. at 499.
37. See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821); see also id. at 92 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
38. Letter from Edmund Randolph, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Joseph Fauchet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the 
French Republic (June 13, 1795), in 1 American State Papers: Foreign Relations 618 (Walter 
Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1833).
39. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 92 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
40. Sloss, supra note 35, at 506.
41. Id.
42. See generally Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty 
Interpretations, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1723 (2007).
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evolving constitutional custom. And while a previously non-existent deference 
doctrine has emerged, it is hardly as entrenched in precedent as such other late-
blooming mechanisms as state sovereign immunity.43
 However novel, deference’s repeated appearance in recent case law illustrates the 
second preliminary point, namely, that it has gained a toehold in modern jurisprudence 
anyway and is further positioned for real gains. Several developments support this 
assessment. First, the doctrine appears somewhat more frequently as an express 
judicial trope. In this, Sanchez-Llamas follows El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng;44 
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano;45 United States v. Stuart;46 and Kolovrat v. 
Oregon.47 Second, as professor David Bederman first demonstrated, from the 1950s 
through the early 1990s, the executive’s interpretation of statutes and treaties has 
been the best predictor of at least the Supreme Court’s own interpretation.48 
Subsequent work by professor Robert Chesney for the federal courts generally 
demonstrates that the executive’s success may not be as pronounced as Bederman’s 
initial work suggests.49 Nonetheless, the modern executive prevails in treaty cases 
almost in inverse proportion to the frequency the executive lost in the early republic. 
Third, explicit articulations of deference have accounted for some of the most recent, 
high-profile lower court opinions. Of note here is United States v. Lindh,50 the 
“American Taliban” case, in which the district court adopted a deference model based 
upon Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC51 and accordingly held that John Walker Lindh 
was not entitled to POW status under the Third Geneva Convention.52 Similarly, in 
Hamdan itself, the D.C. Circuit cited its obligation to defer in adopting the executive’s 
radical interpretation that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not 
extend to armed conflict that crossed international borders.53
43. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1277, 1282–85 (1999) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s handling of state law intrusion into federal constitutional realms and vice versa); 
Martin S. Flaherty, More Apparent than Real: The Revolutionary Commitment to Constitutional Federalism, 
45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 993, 993 (1997) (discussing federalism protections for state governments and 
identifying this doctrine as sovereignty federalism).
44. 525 U.S. 155 (1999). In contrast to its predecessors, however, El Al expressly softens the degree of 
deference to be accorded executive interpretations from “great weight” to “[r]espect is ordinarily due the 
reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international treaty.” Id. at 168. 
See infra notes 54, 79, 80 and accompanying text.
45. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
46. 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
47. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
48. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 953, 961–62, 
1015–16 (1994).
49. Chesney, supra note 42, at 1741–58.
50. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
51. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52. Id. at 556. 
53. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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 The Sanchez-Llamas/Hamdan pairing in the Supreme Court reflects the ongoing 
confusion. On one hand, the doctrine has rhetorically shifted the burden onto parties 
who cling to the historic idea that courts interpreting laws or treaties that touch upon 
foreign affairs owe an obligation to nothing other than their own sound interpretation. 
Yet as Hamdan shows, the ostensible obligation can disappear without a trace and in 
cases that are among the highest profile cases as well.
 B. “Weight”
 At least the Supreme Court’s failure to justify deference may have something to 
do with its actual status in current jurisprudence, Sanchez-Llamas included. Much 
like a blimp, the doctrine appears ponderous but in reality has little weight. The 
leading cases almost always repeat the formula that the executive’s treaty 
interpretations are due “much weight,”54 “great weight,”55 “duty to respect,”56 or, at 
the very least, due consideration in the form of “[r]espect . . . due [to] the reasonable 
views of the Executive Branch.”57 Even a cursory review of the cases, however, 
demonstrates that the impressive-sounding formula does no actual work.
 Start not with In re Ross58 but Charlton v. Kelly,59 the first case ostensibly to 
articulate a deference standard.60 In holding that an extradition treaty made no 
exception for U.S. citizens to be delivered up to Italy, the Court famously deployed 
this statement: “A construction of a treaty by the political department of the 
[g]overnment, while not conclusive upon a court called upon to construe such a treaty 
. . . is nevertheless of much weight.”61 That declaration, however, came only after the 
Court had resolved the matter already. With typical early twentieth-century economy, 
Justice Lurton came to the conclusion based first on the plain meaning of the treaty’s 
term “persons,” next on “accepted principles of public international law” as traced 
through a brief history of the exemption from the eighteenth century, on a reference 
to a treatise on extradition by John Bassett, and on a survey of U.S. treaties’ 
contrasting agreements in which the exception is and is not clearly specified. Only 
then does the “much weight” statement appear with reference to the executive’s 
interpretation of the treaty at hand, and then only in light of the United States’ 
consistent practice with extradition treaties generally. Even then, the Court returns 
54. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913).
55. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961). 
56. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 678 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999). 
58. 140 U.S. 453 (1891). Ross, ostensibly the first deference case, did not actually articulate a standard. 
Moreover, the Court’s analysis relied not simply on the executive’s interpretation of the relevant treaty, 
but on the consistent practice of both treaty-making parties and only after close consideration of the 
treaty’s text. See id. at 466–69. 
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to John Basset Moore, who himself argues the plain meaning, the existence of treaties 
with and without express exceptions, and the apparently joint practice of the United 
States and United Kingdom following the plain meaning of their own 1842 
extradition treaty.62
 The canon has generally done even less work ever since. In Sullivan v. Kidd, the 
Court for the first time recycles the “much weight” standard, but again only after a 
careful review of the treaty provisions at hand, the general principles of public 
international law, and the extreme consequences that would result from the opposing 
interpretation, which would have effectively allowed subjects throughout the British 
empire to inherit land in the United States.63 The pattern continued in more recent 
times with Kolovrat v. Oregon,64 where the Court ratcheted up the apparent deference 
standard to “great weight,” for the interpretations “by the departments of government 
particularly charged with [a treaty’s] negotiation and enforcement.”65 Notwithstanding 
this language, the Court turned first to the treaty’s text, its general purpose, the 
canon that treaties conveying rights are to be construed liberally, other similar treaties 
to which the United States was a party, and even the “hope[s]” and “desire[s]” of the 
nationals of each country for whom the treaty was intended to benefit.66 Even when 
Justice Black gets to the practice with regard to the treaty under consideration, he 
refers to the mutual application of the treaty by both the contracting parties.67 Much 
the same pattern applies in Sumitomo, another “great weight” case, where Chief 
Justice Burger considers the executive’s interpretation only after pages of textual 
analysis, and even then only in conjunction with the parallel interpretation followed 
by Japan.68 At the risk of monotony, the same holds for Stuart, where the agency’s 
interpretation of a treaty as a source of deference gets one sentence amidst paragraphs 
of more conventional interpretive analysis.69
 For that matter, the same pattern holds in Sanchez-Llamas. For all that Sanchez-
Llamas may be taken as a reaffirmation of deference, the canon plays an exceptionally 
modest role. It simply does not figure at all in the Court’s consideration of the case’s 
first issue: whether the Vienna Convention on Consular Relation’s (VCCR) “full 
effect” language requires the application of an exclusionary rule.70 To address this, 
Chief Justice Roberts relied exclusively on an analysis of treaty text in the context of 
62. See id. at 466–69.
63. 254 U.S. 433, 435–43 (1921).
64. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
65. Id. at 194.
66. Id. at 194, 195–97.
67. Id. at 191–95.
68. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180–85 (1982).
69. 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989).
70. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337–39 (2006); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
art. 36, ¶ 2, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100–101.
129
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
“constitutional common law”71 remedies for similar domestic rights.72 Citation to 
Kolovrat ’s version of the “great weight” standard does appear with regard to the issue 
of whether the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) interpretation of the VCCR, or 
the treaty itself, requires the setting aside of state procedural default rules on habeas,73 
especially in light of the ICJ’s contrary rulings.74 The Kolovrat citation, however, 
comes only after consideration of the Supreme Court’s own precedent on this point 
in Breard v. Greene,75 which itself did not rely on deference of the statute of the ICJ, 
nor, ironically for a deference case, of Marbury’s proposition that the federal courts in 
our constitutional system have the duty “to say what the law is.”76 After then devoting 
a single sentence to the executive’s interpretation of the VCCR, the Chief Justice 
proceeds to a close and substantive critique of the ICJ’s analysis as it applies to the 
domestic constitutional system of the United States.77
 Perhaps even more ironically, the only case to have produced an opinion in which 
deference actually drives the analysis is Hamdan. The irony diminishes, however, 
upon noting that the opinion comes from Justice Thomas in dissent. As on many 
other points, the Thomas dissent parts company with the majority with regard to 
whether Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the “conflict with 
al Qaeda.”78 Before attempting any independent analysis, Justice Thomas finds the 
argument that the provision does apply to be “meritless” based on the Court’s “duty 
to defer” to the conclusion of the Justice (not State) Department as accepted by the 
President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.79 Only after this does Justice 
Thomas adopt the argument that the provision’s language applying its protections to 
“conflicts not of any international character” cannot apply since the struggle with 
al-Qaeda occurs “in various nations around the globe.”80 The dissent does concede 
that the majority’s position, which follows the treaty’s text, history, structure, and 
near consensus interpretation, is “plausible.”81 Yet “where, as here, an ambiguous 
treaty provision . . . is susceptible of two plausible, and reasonable, interpretations, 
71. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975).
72. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355.
73. Id. at 355–66.
74. See Avéna and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 56, 112, 128 (Mar. 31), http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf; LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 477–78, 495, 
556–57 (June 27), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/104/4663.pdf.
75. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
76. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
77. See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350–60.
78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 718–19 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
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our precedents require us to defer to the Executive’s interpretation.”82 Here, at last, is 
real deference. The only trouble is, it is not actually compelled by the case law to 
which it alludes.
 That case law instead shows that deference in this setting is essentially an add-on. 
Invariably, it appears as little more than a passing reference to conclusions that have 
already been reached on the basis of significant textual, structural, purposive, 
comparative, or general international legal analysis. To the extent the cases diverge 
from this pattern, they show that deference to executive interpretation is not on the 
table. At times, the Court instead has considered early practice as evidence of the 
treaty-making parties’ intent. At other times, it has relied on the longstanding 
practice of all state parties to a treaty as probative of mutual understanding and 
perhaps reliance. Of course, it could be that deference to the executive is really what 
is driving the case outcomes, notwithstanding what the Court actually says. But 
were this so, and were this proposition somehow provable, the Court’s duty to offer 
reasoned arguments requires it to say so. And if not, the Court should make that 
stance plain. As it is, the halfway stance of announcing a standard that does no real 
work serves neither the standard’s advocates, the detractors, nor the public.
 Nor, it should be pointed out, has the Court made out the nominal standard as 
consistently as is sometimes claimed. Prior to Sanchez-Llamas, the Court’s previous 
articulation of the deference standard came in more muted form in El Al.83 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Ginsburg demoted the “great weight” standard to the mere 
“[r]espect [that] is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch 
concerning the meaning of an international treaty.”84 Flipping the usual pattern, she 
then concludes that “the Government’s construction . . . is most faithful to the 
[treaty’s] text, purpose, and overall structure,” devoting the rest of the opinion to 
demonstrating just that.85 In this she follows Justice Stone, who himself demoted 
“great weight” to mere “weight”86 or “recourse,”87 and then only to negotiating history 
or diplomatic correspondence by the treaty-making parties rather than executive 
interpretation more generally.
 Then again, blimps sometimes f ly. For now, the actual clout of the deference 
doctrine may be more apparent than real. But mere appearances often presage reality. 
United States Reports is filled with doctrines that began as novelties, became plausible, 
and are now entrenched. State sovereign immunity is one.88 The assault on customary 
international law is on the way.89 Judicial deference to the executive in foreign 
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999).
84. Id. at 168.
85. Id. at 168–77.
86. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933). 
87. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926).
88. See Are We to be a Nation?, supra note 44, at 1283–86.
89. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.692, 735–38 (2004).
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relations is already far more pronounced than at the Founding. Numerous advocates 
and commentators strongly press for the doctrine in articles and briefs. Whether 
they say they are doing it or not, courts today generally follow the executive’s lead. 
Justice Thomas’s dissent may be a first step for the Court in both proclaiming and 
actually following an obligation to defer. Deference, in short, may attain the status 
its advocates seek, and sooner than may be supposed. All this confirms the paradox 
of taking a feeble doctrine very seriously.
C. Justifications
 Just as deference’s status and weight remain muddled, so too do the judicial 
arguments made on the doctrine’s behalf. For its part, the Supreme Court has never 
articulated a justification, a failure that suggests either that the doctrine is so well 
entrenched that a defense would be superfluous or that the doctrine has crept into 
the case law with little or no thought. Lower courts, commentators, and advocates 
have therefore had to fill the breach. At the risk of some oversimplification, two sets 
of defenses are prominent: institutional expertise and democratic accountability. In 
treaty interpretation as in other settings, far and away the most frequently voiced 
defenses sound in the purported institutional superiority of the “political,” especially 
the executive, branches to guide U.S. foreign relations. As it happens, such foreign 
affairs expertise resides in the very branches that are directly accountable to the 
American electorate, especially the one office elected nationwide. So perfunctory, 
however, is the Supreme Court’s general treatment of the deference doctrine that its 
own explanations for the obligation provide only the most conclusory defenses. For 
more extensive articulations, one must look to either the lower federal courts or 
commentators.
 Perhaps the most familiar justification for foreign affairs deference lays in the 
political branches’—above all the executive’s—comparative institutional advantages 
in the conduct of foreign affairs. Among other things, these advantages are most 
commonly said to arise from the executive’s access to information, its comparative 
decisiveness, and its consequent position as the branch best suited to speak on behalf 
of the nation with one voice.90
 To these direct assertions of institutional superiority comes an indirect counterpart 
that arises when the executive has engaged in longstanding practice. Starting with In 
re Ross, the Supreme Court has usually, though not always, linked a presumption to 
defer to treaty interpretations that the executive has “consistently upheld,” especially 
in different settings and circumstances.91 Emphasis on executive consistency does not 
necessarily reflect comparative institutional advantage. On the analogy of treaty to 
90. See John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty 
Interpretation, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 851, 873–77 (2001) (reviewing Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out 
There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (2000)).
91. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913); cf. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 468 (1891) (quoting a 
communication made in 1881 by the U.S. minister for Japan to the secretary of state: “The President 
and the department have always construed the treaty of 1858” in a certain manner).
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contract law, longstanding practice may reflect a species of reliance interest, especially 
when other states that have acceded to an agreement have followed the same 
interpretation.92 Especially, early consistent interpretation may be probative of the 
treaty-making parties’ controlling intent,93 much the same way the Supreme Court 
privileges the actions of early Congresses as plausible ref lections of the original 
understandings of the Constitution’s ratifiers.94 Yet deference keyed to consistency 
may also reflect institutional competence nonetheless. A longstanding and unbroken 
interpretation of a treaty, or provisions in a particular type of treaty, plausibly reflects 
all the executive’s advantages in foreign affairs on the theory that superior knowledge, 
decisiveness, and special position as the primary voice of the United States in foreign 
affairs all pointed to a particular interpretation early on. And these interpretations 
have served to confirm such a reading of the treaty or particular treaty provisions 
ever since, apart from the vagaries of changes in administration or the need to adopt 
litigation positions in particular cases.
 To these values of expertise may be added an overlapping set of justifications 
founded on democratic accountability. The strong version of these claims tends to 
follow back to Hamilton’s observation that, although treaties may presumptively be 
“the supreme Law of the Land,” and as such the province of the judicial department, 
they nonetheless remain contracts between states, thereby making them instruments 
of foreign policy and in turn the job of the political branches—above all, the executive 
branch.95 This division comports with democratic accountability in at least three ways. 
First, it follows the original assignment of tasks by “We the People” as a matter of 
higher constitutional lawmaking. Second, the assignment places the conduct of foreign 
policy in the hands of representatives accountable to the people during normal times 
through periodic elections. Third, and with special regard for the President, deference 
to the executive in part reflects the necessity of designating a primary voice to speak 
92. See Charlton, 229 U.S. at 472–74.
93. See, e.g., Ross, 140 U.S. at 475–76; Charlton, 229 U.S. at 467–68; see also Chesney, supra note 42, at 
1741–43 (distinguishing executive interpretive authority and executive practice as evidence of intent).
94.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (rejecting a challenge to the extension of copyright 
terms with heavy reliance on the actions of the first Congress); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 455, 457 
(2002) (rejecting Utah’s challenge to a census method undertaken by North Carolina based in part on 
the meaning of the phrase “actual enumeration” in the first Congress); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 783, 790–91 (1983) (finding the legislative chaplaincy does not violate the Establishment Clause in 
part because the first Congress made use of such a chaplaincy: 
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of 
constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply historical patterns. In 
this context, historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended 
the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied to 
the practice authorized by the First Congress—their actions reveal their intent.
 (emphasis added)); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316, 401–02 (1819) (relying on the 
actions of the first Congress in part to uphold the establishment of the national bank); see also Michael 
Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of History, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1745, 
1746–47 (2006).
95. See The Federalist No. 75, at 449–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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on behalf of the United States in foreign relations combined with the propriety of 
designating the one policymaker who is elected on a national basis.
 A more modest, though influential, democratic argument comes from professor 
Curtis Bradley.96 Bradley contends that the judiciary does and should defer to executive 
interpretation of treaties in much the same way it bows to executive, especially agency, 
interpretations of statutes under Chevron.97 To a significant extent, he bases the 
analogy upon considerations of “fit.”98 As under Chevron, courts interpreting treaties 
will not resort to deference when the relevant text is unambiguous. Yet, as also under 
Chevron, where ambiguity exists, or where the treaty simply fails to address the issue, 
courts will generally follow the executive’s interpretation unless it is unreasonable.99
 Though Chevron deference has much to do with administrative expertise, 
professor Bradley acknowledges that its ultimate justification rests upon the inference 
that Congress has delegated authority to resolve ambiguities or fill gaps to the agency 
assigned with administering a given statute.100 It follows that for the Chevron analogy 
to work, the theory must be that the President plus two-thirds of the senators present 
must be presumed to delegate similar authority to either the State Department as a 
general matter or to specific agencies that a particular treaty designates for 
implementation.
 As critics have pointed out, the Chevron analogy is not without problems. The 
Court has made clear that full Chevron deference is most appropriate when an agency 
has offered an interpretation of a statute based upon the type of deliberation that 
comes from providing interested parties with notice and a hearing or some form of 
adjudication. Less thorough deliberation ordinarily triggers no more than Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co.101 consideration, and mere agency litigation positions do not command 
even that.102 It is far from clear how the treaty setting will produce deliberative 
opportunities to the same extent as domestic statutes, especially in the case of human 
rights treaties. Professor Michael Van Alstine has rightly pointed out, moreover, that 
it is even less clear how a general treaty is like an organic statute that regulates a 
particular field and creates an agency to administer the policies that the statute sets 
out.103 As will be seen, neither the problems with the Chevron analogy, nor with the 
justifications for deference in general, end here.
96. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649 (2000).
97. Id. at 651–53 (referring to the reasoning of, and the deference granted by the Supreme Court, in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
98. Bradley, supra note 96, at 703–04.
99. Id. at 669.
100. Id. at 670–71. That said, professor Bradley rightly notes that in reality, considerations of executive 
expertise and, at least on the surface, democratic accountability are prevalent. Id. at 669–70.
101. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
102. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988); see also Evan Criddle, Scholarship 
Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 Yale L.J. 1927, 1934 (2003).
103. Here the leading analysis is provided in Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty 
Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 Geo. L.J. 1885, 1897–1902 (2006).
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iii. sOMEthing OLd: sEparatiOn Of pOWErs, dOMEstiC and fOrEign
 A. First Principles
 Judicial foreign affairs deference has not been without numerous critics from 
numerous angles. Most, however, share a common reliance on separation of powers 
in general and a heavy dependence on Marbury in particular. As the Court ironically 
reiterated in Sanchez-Llamas, it is emphatically the province of the judiciary to declare 
what the law is.104 It follows that treaties, both as international law and the “supreme 
Law of the Land,” are in the first instance to be interpreted as such, a tenet that 
includes any theory of interpretive delegation, which would have to come through 
the law itself. This form of argument is fine as far as it goes. But the formal Marbury 
argument falls short nonetheless. In particular, it fails to engage with the larger, 
functional separation of powers assumptions that its defenders put forward, above all 
the argument from executive expertise and efficiency.
 Engaging these assumptions instead requires a more general review of separation 
of powers’ first principles. The exercise may not break new ground. Yet the review 
remains worth the effort for at least two reasons. First, the general functions of 
American separation of powers remain oddly underappreciated even in domestic 
constitutional theory, in part due to a misplaced reliance on more formalist 
approaches.105 Second, even though foreign relations law entails separation of powers, 
the application of the latter to the former remains oddly narrow and workman-like 
compared to domestic analysis.
 As I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere, conventional sources of constitutional 
text, structure, and, above all, history provide substantial yet frustratingly insufficient 
guidance in resolving modern separation of powers controversies. Absent specific 
text, and even then rarely, these sources do not deliver precise answers to the types of 
questions that generally wind up in the courts. A classic case in this regard is the 
removal power, which has bedeviled American constitutional law ever since the 
question first arose with regard to the First Congress’s attempt to limit the President’s 
ability to fire whoever would occupy the newly established office of Secretary of 
State.106 And as is widely noted, the lack of precise guidance only grows in the foreign 
relations context. Not for nothing did Edward Corwin declare that the Constitution 
extended to the Congress and the President in particular an “invitation to struggle” 
in foreign affairs.107 Conversely, lack of precision does not mean there is no guidance 
whatsoever. As set out in the Constitution, separation of powers is a sketch partially 
inked in at the top to be worked out more fully over time,108 consistent with several 
functions that become especially clear by reference to the history of the Founding.
104. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006).
105. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1738–45 (1996).
106. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 
Mich. L. Rev. 545, 641–44 (2004).
107. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787–1984, at 201 (5th ed. 1984).
108. Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1777–78.
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 Of these functions, by far the most salient is balance. Perhaps the single most 
important factor that led the founding generation to reconsider and rethink separation 
of powers was the concentration of too much power in the state legislatures at the 
expense of the other branches of government, an imbalance that in turn led to the 
counterintuitive discovery of “democratic despotism.”109 Benjamin Rush, for example, 
condemned the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution in part because “the supreme, 
absolute, and uncontrolled power of the State is lodged in the hands of one body of 
men.”110 Thomas Jefferson made the same point more eloquently, lamenting Virginia’s 
Constitution of 1777, writing:
 All the powers of the government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, 
result to the legislative body. The concentrating [of] these [powers] in the 
same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no 
alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not 
by a single one. 173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one. . . .  
[G]overnment . . . should not only be founded on free principles, but . . . the 
powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several 
bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without 
being effectively checked and restrained by the others.111
With few exceptions, at no time during the Founding period did any advocates of 
separation of powers argue for a complete, rigid, or formal separation. Rather, the 
Founders embraced the doctrine above all else for its general promise that no branch 
of government would ever again become as powerful, or tyrannical, as the original 
state legislatures.112
 Separation of powers further addressed the problem of democratic despotism by 
reconceptualizing the idea of accountability. Straightforward representation, in the 
sense of replicating the populace as much as possible in the halls of the legislature, 
had proven unworkable and dangerous. In the eyes of many Founders, services such 
as annual elections, a relatively broad franchise, term limits, and rotation in office 
had paradoxically rendered the state legislatures less representative, or at least less 
representative of the people’s more deliberative selves, by promoting factions and 
demagoguery. The solution eventually came in the form of giving all the branches of 
government a more representative foundation. This strategy, in the words of 
Massachusetts’s reform constitution of 1780, would ensure that “[a]ll power residing 
originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and 
officers of government, vested with authority, whether legislature, executive, or 
judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.”113 
109. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 404 (1998) 
(quoting John Adams).
110. Wood, supra note 109, at 441 (1998) (quoting Benjamin Rush).
111. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in Thomas Jefferson: Writings 123, 245 (Merrill 
D. Peterson ed., 1984).
112. Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1763–64, 1766.
113. Mass. Const. pt. I, art. V.
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Before the development of this new conception of “ joint accountability,” executives 
and judiciaries were generally chosen and controlled by the legislatures. Following 
the lead of Massachusetts, the federal Constitution embraced the new strategy 
through innovations that are today taken for granted. The new President was to be 
less or more directly elected. The judiciary was to be chosen by that directly elected 
official in conjunction with the upper house of Congress. In these ways joint 
accountability clearly enhanced the independence and authority of each of the 
branches against the others, particularly the newly strengthened executive and 
judiciary. But they also, and critically, ensured that no branch of government could 
lay claim to the mandate of the people to pursue policies not widely supported.114
 After, but only after, this comes a further functional promise of efficiency, at 
least in terms of historical frequency, tone, and emphasis. A concern with effectiveness 
in turn arose out of at least two considerations. One was the general weakness of 
republican forms of government. Shays’s Rebellion, during which farmers in western 
Massachusetts rioted against state authority in 1786, provided perhaps the most 
spectacular manifestation of this problem.115 The other concern was weaknesses 
specific to the Articles of Confederation, especially in the conduct of foreign relations. 
Perhaps most notoriously here, lack of national power enabled the states to frustrate 
U.S. treaty commitments, which provided the United Kingdom in particular a 
pretext to keep troops stationed in the nation’s northwestern territory.116 These 
considerations primarily, though not exclusively,117 militated toward an increasing 
emphasis on the independence and authority of the executive.118 This emphasis 
helped confirm the principle of a new federal executive branch headed by a single 
person (the original meaning of “unitary executive”), selection independent of the 
legislature, and specific grants of power beyond merely implementing the laws, 
including the authority to command the armed forces, make treaties, and recognize 
foreign governments through the power to receive ambassadors. There is, however, 
virtually no evidence of any general grant of foreign affairs power.119 Nor is there any 
114. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1766–89; see also Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The 
Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1563, 1566–67, 1582–85 (1997). 
115. See Wood, supra note 109, at 412.
116. See Richard B. Morris, The American Revolution Reconsidered 152–57 (1967); Frederick W. 
Marks III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution, at 
x–xv (1973); Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign 
Policy 66–75 (1961); Edward S. Corwin, National Supremacy: Treaty Power vs. State Power 
21–30 (1913); Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 
1 Persp. Am. Hist. 233, 267–69 (1984).
117. For example, the Constitution dealt with the problem of state treaty violations primarily through 
making treaties “the supreme Law of the Land,” which is to say, enhancing judicial power. See U.S. 
Const. art. VI, § 2; Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, 
and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2122–23, 2125 (1999).
118. See Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789: A Study in 
Constitutional History 51–52 (1922).
119. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 106, at 644.
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specific evidence of special authority to interpret treaties to any greater extent than 
the Constitution or federal statutes.
 Among other things, the more general, functional approach to separation of 
powers that conventional sources sustain better reveals the true potency of the 
Marbury argument against deference. The point is not simply that it is the formal job 
of the courts, rather than the executive, to interpret the law in a judicial setting. The 
larger point, rather, is twofold. First, and implicit in the judicial function, remains 
the courts’ role in providing a neutral forum for the vindication of individual claims, 
particularly with regard to fundamental rights and particularly against the 
government. Second, and no less potent, the courts’ insistence on this traditional role 
serves the core function of preserving balance among the branches to ensure that 
individual excesses do not become systemic.
 B. Restoring Balance, Step One
 None of this should appear novel. To the contrary, this analysis merely unpacks 
Hamilton’s dictum that, “[t]he truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that 
the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A 
BILL OF RIGHTS.”120 This return to a more complete account of first principles 
nonetheless results in two contemporary claims.
 First, the competing functional goals central to separation of powers badly need 
to be restored to modern separation of powers analysis in foreign affairs in such 
newly contested areas as deference. Too often, such values as balance and the 
Founders’ conception of accountability get lost in the face of the executive’s ostensible 
expertise and efficiency in foreign affairs, other core values near and dear to 
Hamilton’s heart. No less than Hamilton himself, however, each of the core purposes 
that a conventional account of separation of powers restores requires reference and 
consideration. Shorthand judicial references to Marbury simply do not suffice.
 Second, separation of powers in its more completely restored, functional version 
reaffirms the wisdom of the founding practice of zero deference. Consider simply the 
core value of balance. Arguably the primus inter pares of all separation of powers 
functions, concern about accretion of power in any one set of hands, two hundred 
years into our history must focus on the executive as “the most dangerous branch,” 
based simply on the growth of the President’s domestic authority during that time.121 
This development, the executive’s practical increase in foreign affairs authority, and 
the apparent founding practice against deference in treaty interpretation at a 
minimum shift the burden onto those who would assert that changed circumstances 
now cut in favor of augmenting presidential power.
 Similar analysis holds true for the more complex, joint conception of accountability. 
Recall here that the idea helps justify multi-branch involvement in an issue not simply 
on the ground of formal governmental role, but further on the basis of ensuring a 
more widespread and thorough conception of representativeness before particularly 
120. The Federalist No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
121. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1816 –19.
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bold initiatives can go forward. With regard to treaties, the conception of joint 
accountability actually works to validate the practice of Senate reservations, 
understandings, and declarations. Yet it also works against deference. Working 
through this argument for present purposes would require an overlong detour into 
admittedly contested thickets of constitutional theory. Suffice it to stipulate that 
courts derive at least some measure of legitimacy from popular appointment and 
reference to the nation’s evolving fundamental commitments as evidenced in 
constitutional custom and practice.122 To the extent this is true, it affords an additional 
reason for judges not to cede authority to either the President (or for that matter, the 
Senate) in the implementation of treaties lest a more insulated, deliberative, yet 
nonetheless democratic, form of consideration be eliminated from the process.
 In addition, a fully restored approach to separation of powers does more than 
counter certain sets of functional considerations against others. The particular 
functional considerations, which a more thorough consideration of text, history, and 
structure reveal, speak to more specific arguments for deference. Take, for example, 
the ostensible analogy to Chevron. As noted, that analogy doctrinally rests on the 
fiction of legislative delegation of interpretative and regulatory authority to the 
executive through statutory ambiguity. The functional purposes of balance and joint 
accountability bolster the arguments that this fiction be given credence narrowly, 
and then only where executive processes mimic legislative deliberation, especially in 
the area of foreign affairs where the executive is nowhere more potent. Likewise, 
balance and accountability also put pressure on the Chevron analogy to the extent it 
bases deference on the executive’s expertise outright. In this instance, the direct 
confrontation of functions merely replay themselves, with balance in particular 
directly countering expertise—a stalemate that at worst would preserve the Founding’s 
zero deference approach, absent some compelling argument to the contrary.
iV. sOMEthing nEW: gLObaL sEparatiOn Of pOWErs in a gLObaLizEd WOrLd
 That “old-time” separation of powers should be enough to turn back any trend 
toward deference. The balance of this essay, however, offers one more interpretation, 
which is at once more original and potentially the most powerful. Call this separation 
of powers in a global context—or “global separation of powers” for short. The premise 
is straightforward. It assumes, first, that globalization generally has resulted in a net 
gain in power not for judiciaries, but for the “political” branches—and above all, for 
executives—within domestic legal systems. In other words, the growth of globalized 
transnational government networks has yielded an imbalance among the three (to 
four) major branches of government in terms of separation of powers. Such an 
imbalance, among other things, poses a significant and growing threat for the 
protection of individual rights by domestic courts, whether on the basis of international 
or national norms.
122. For a recent and sophisticated attempt to elucidate the democratic basis of the judiciary’s role, see 
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001). For a sympathetic rejoinder, 
see Martin S. Flaherty, The Better Angels of Self-Government, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1773, 1775 (2003).
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 Yet if separation of powers analysis helps identify the problem, it also suggests 
the solution. If globalization has comparatively empowered executives in particular, 
it follows that fostering, rather than prohibiting, judicial globalization provides a 
parallel approach to help restore the balance. In this way, judicial separation of 
powers justifies judicial borrowing on both non-democratic and democratic grounds. 
From a non democratic perspective, transnational judicial dialogue with reference to 
international law and parallel comparative questions gives national judiciaries a 
unique expertise on aspects of foreign affairs, and so is a further exception to the 
usual presumption that the judiciary is the least qualified branch of government for 
the purposes of foreign affairs. More importantly, from a democratic point of view, 
restoring the balance that separation of powers seeks has the effect of promoting self-
government to the extent that separation of powers is itself seen as a predicate for any 
well-ordered form of democratic self-government.
 A. Globalization and Imbalance
 Globalization, and the corollary erosion of sovereignty, may not yet be clichés, 
but they are hardly news. As any human rights lawyer would be quick to point out, 
the post–World War II emergence of international human rights law represents one 
of the most profound assaults on the notion that state sovereigns are the irreducible, 
impermeable building blocks of foreign affairs.123 But the nation-state model has 
been eroding no less profoundly in less formal ways. Central, here, is the insight that 
governments today no longer simply interact state to state, through heads of state, 
foreign ministers, ambassadors, and consuls. Increasingly, if not already predominantly, 
there is interaction through global networks in which subunits of governments deal 
directly with one another. In separation of powers terms, executive branches at all 
levels interact less as the sole representative of the nation, than as partners in 
education ministries, intelligence agencies, or health and education initiatives. 
Likewise, though lagging, legislators and committees from different jurisdictions 
meet to share approaches and discuss common ways forward. Last, and least powerful 
if not least dangerous, judges from different nations share approaches in conference, 
teaching abroad programs, and of course, formally citing to one another in their 
opinions. Only recently has pioneering work by Anne-Marie Slaughter, among 
others, given a comprehensive picture of this facet of globalization.124 That work, in 
turn, suggests that among the results of this process has been a net shift of domestic 
power in any given state toward the executive and away from the judiciary and the 
protection of fundamental rights.
123. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Complementarity on Human Rights Organizations in International Human 
Rights/The Rise of Transnational Networks as the “Third Globalization,” 21 H.R.L.J. 307 (2000).
124. See Slaughter, supra note 7 (further developing her previous writings on this subject).
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  1. Executive Globalization
 Where international human rights lawyers seek to directly pierce the veil of state 
sovereignty, international relations experts have chronicled the no less significant 
desegregation of state sovereignty through the emergence of sub-governmental 
networks. Nowhere has this process been more greatly marked than with regard to 
the interaction of various levels of regulators within the executive branches—in 
parliamentary systems, the “governments”125—of individual nations. Starting with 
pioneering work by Robert Koehane and Joseph Nye,126 and more recently enhanced 
and consolidated by Slaughter, current scholarship offers a multifaceted picture of 
what may be termed “executive globalization.” That said, much work remains to be 
done on how the “Global War on Terror” post-9/11 has accelerated this process with 
regard to security agencies. Nor, on a more general level, has significant work been 
done as to what the net effects of executive networking have been in separation of 
powers terms. The following reviews what has been done and suggests the likely 
answers to the questions that arise.
 Slaughter, somewhat consciously overstating, terms government regulators who 
associate with their counterparts abroad “the new diplomats.”127 This characterization 
immediately raises the question of who they are and in what contexts they operate. 
Perhaps ironically, desegregation begins at the top when presidents, prime ministers, 
and heads of state gather in settings such as the G-8, not only as the representatives 
of their states but as chief executives with common problems, which may include 
dealing with other branches of their respective governments. Moving down the 
ladder come an array of different specialists who meet across borders with one another 
both formally and informally: central bankers, finance ministers, environmental 
regulators, health officials, government educators, prosecutors, and—today perhaps 
most importantly—military, security, and intelligence officials. The frameworks in 
which these horizontal groups associate are various. One type of setting might be 
transnational organizations under the aegis of the United Nations, the European 
Union, NATO, or the WTO. Another framework can be networks that meet within 
the structure of executive agreements, such as the Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
of 1998. Other groups meet outside governmental frameworks, at least to begin with, 
with examples ranging from the Basel Committee to the Financial Crime 
Enforcement Network.128
 As important as which executive officials currently cross borders is what they 
actually do. The activities that make up executive transgovernmentalism may be 
sliced in various ways.129 One breakdown divides the phenomenon into: (a) 
125. Here, I note the perhaps telling convention that the executive in a parliamentary system is referred to as 
the “government” rather than the “administration,” as in the United States.
126. See, e.g., Keohane & Nye, supra note 7.
127. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 36.
128. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 36–64.
129. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the 
Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002).
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information networks; (b) harmonization networks; and (c) enforcement networks.130 
An obvious yet vital activity, many government regulatory networks interact simply 
to exchange relevant information and expertise. Such exchanges include brainstorming 
on common problems, sharing information on identified challenges, banding together 
to collect new information, and reviewing how one another’s agencies perform.131 
Harmonization networks, which usually arise in settings such as the European Union 
or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), entail relevant 
administrators working together to fulfill the mandate of common regulations 
pursuant to the relevant international instrument.132
 For present purposes, however, enforcement networks most greatly implicate 
separation of powers concerns precisely because they involve police and security 
agencies sharing intelligence in specific cases, and, more generally, in capacity 
building and training. In the context of Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) maintained “numerous links with other police services, 
particularly with those in Britain, but also with North American agencies and others 
elsewhere in the world . . . [including] the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . .”133 In 
a relatively benign vein, the Independent Police Commission charged with reforming 
the RUC recommended further international contact, in part because “the 
globalisation of crime requires police services around the world to collaborate with 
each other more effectively and also because the exchange of best practice ideas 
between police services will help the effectiveness of domestic policing.”134
 It is exactly at this point, moreover, that 9/11-era concerns render the enforcement 
aspect of executive globalization ever more salient, and often more ominous. To take 
one example, consider the shadowy practice of “extraordinary renditions,” that is, 
when the security forces of one country capture a person and send him or her to 
another country where rough interrogation practices are likely to take place—all 
outside the usual mechanisms of extradition.135 To this extent, transnational executive 
cooperation moves from general, mutual bolstering to the expansion of one another’s 
jurisdiction in the most direct and concrete fashion possible.
 All this, in turn, suggests a profound shift in power to the executives in any given 
nation state. At least in the United States, the conventional wisdom holds that the 
executive branch has grown in power relative to Congress or the courts, not even 
130. Id. at 10–27.
131. Id. at 28.
132. See Sydney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 
54 Admin. L. Rev. 435, 436–46 (2002).
133. The Indep. Comm’n for Policing in N. Ir., A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland 
101 (1999), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.
134. Id.
135. For a discussion of the practice with regard to international human rights law, see Comm. on Int’l 
Human Rights, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n & The Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU Sch. of Law, 
Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions,” 60 Record. 
13 (2005).
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counting the rise of administrative and regulatory agencies, even in purely domestic 
terms.136 Add to the specter of enlarged executives worldwide who are enhancing one 
another’s power, through information and enforcement networks in particular, and 
the conclusion becomes presumptive. Add further the cooperation of executives in 
light of 9/11, and the pro-executive implications of government globalization become 
more troubling still.
  2. Legislative Globalization
 This pro-executive conclusion becomes even harder to resist given the slowness 
with which national legislators have been interacting with their counterparts. Several 
factors account for the slower pace of legislative globalization. Membership in a 
legislature almost by definition entails not just representation but representation 
keyed to national and subnational units. The turnover among legislators typically 
outpaces either executive officials or, for that matter, judges. In further contrast to 
legislators, regulators need to be specialists, and specialization facilitates cross-border 
interaction if only because it is easier to identify counterparts and focus upon common 
challenges.137
 Transnational legislative networks exist nonetheless and are growing. To take 
one example, national legislators have begun to work with one another in the context 
of such international organizations as NATO, the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). To take another example, independent legislative networks have begun to 
emerge, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union and Parliamentarians for Global 
Action. 138
 Yet even were national legislators to “catch up” to their executive counterparts in 
any meaningful way, the result would not necessarily be more robust or adequate 
protection of fundamental rights in times of perceived danger or the protection of 
minority rights at any time. Human rights organizations around the world are all too 
familiar with the democratic pathology of draconian statutes hastily enacted in 
response to actual attacks or perceived threats, including the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act in the United Kingdom, the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States, and the 
Internal Security Act in Malaysia.139 It is for this reason that the essential player in 
the matter of rights protection must remain the courts.
136. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1727–28.
137. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 104–06.
138. See id. at 104–30.
139. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/
contents; USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Internal Security Act 1960 (Act 
No. 82) (Malay.), http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2082.pdf.
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  3. Judicial Globalization
 Several years ago, still Justice O’Connor visited Queen’s University Belfast to 
participate in a summer academic program that also involved schools from the 
Republic of Ireland and the United States. During the course of her visit, she was 
able to meet with local leaders of the bench and bar and exchange experiences, 
compare notes, and talk shop with her U.K. and Irish counterparts.140
 This is but one facet of what Slaughter calls the “constructi[on of] a global legal 
system” through both formal and informal transnational judicial networks.141 Such 
judicial globalization, broadly conceived, occurs in several ways. The most mundane 
yet potentially transformative ways are the increasing number of face-to-face meetings 
through teaching, conferences, and more formal exchanges. Next, and directly tied 
to classic economic globalization, courts of different nations have transformed the 
idea of simple comity to coordination in tackling complex multi-national commercial 
litigation. Of immense regional importance, the dialogue between the European 
Court of Justice and national courts constitutes a more formal, horizontal aspect of 
direct interaction among judiciaries.142
 For the purposes of present analysis, however, by far the most important aspects 
of judicial globalization involve national courts’ use of comparative materials and 
international law—above all international human rights law. Ostensibly new and 
controversial in the United States, this aspect of globalization is familiar in most other 
jurisdictions. As noted, national, supreme, and appellate courts have with apparent 
frequency cited to comparable case law in other jurisdictions as at least persuasive 
authority to resolve domestic constitutional issues.143 Likewise, such courts also cite 
with increasing frequency the human rights jurisprudence of such transnational 
tribunals as the European Court of Human Rights and its Inter-American 
counterpart.144 In spectacular fashion, the House of Lords has recently been doing 
both.145 Likewise, the still-recent South African Constitution famously requires judges 
interpreting its Bill of Rights to consult international law while expressly allowing 
140. See Press Release, Queen’s Univ. Belfast, American Law School Visit to Queen’s (June 19, 2007), 
available at http://www.qub.ac.uk/home/TheUniversity/GeneralServices/News/ArchivesPressReleases-
CampusNews/2007PressReleases/06-2007PressReleases/#d.en.72245.
141. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 65. Slaughter has earlier written about this phenomenon extensively. See 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Court to Court, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 708 (1998).
142. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 82–99.
143. See, e.g., Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace in Zimb. v. Att’y Gen. of Zimb., 14 H.R.L.J. 323 
(1993) (surveying comparative and international law in interpreting the Zimbabwean Constitution 
regarding delay in application of the death penalty).
144. See, e.g., HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu, [1999] 2 H.K.C. 10 (C.F.I.) (opinion of the Court of Appeal of Hong 
Kong).
145. See, e.g., A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 (H.L.) (conjoined 
appeals) (Eng.).
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them to consult “foreign,” i.e., comparative, law.146 So marked is the phenomenon that 
several comparative constitutional law casebooks that highlight such borrowing have 
carved out a significant market niche, even in the United States.147
 It follows that in all these ways the global interaction of judges strengthens their 
hands within their respective countries. In both theory and in the substance of these 
interactions, the bolstering of judiciaries generally works toward a greater protection 
of individual and minority rights. But while leading authorities view judicial 
globalization as outpacing its legislative counterpart, so too do they describe a world 
in which executive and regulatory interaction outpaces them all.
 To this extent, judicial globalization helps identify a problem, yet also suggests a 
solution. The problem, simply, is that transgovernmental globalization taken as a 
whole draws power to national executive branches and away from rights-protecting 
judiciaries. Against this problem, the solution is to foster the judicial side of the 
phenomenon, particularly with regard to the use of comparative and international 
materials.
 B. Restoring Balance Redux
 The true potency of global separation of powers analysis, however, lies elsewhere. 
To its proponents, deference follows from the executive branch’s ostensibly greater 
expertise in foreign relations at a time when foreign relations is becoming ever more 
important. Yet global separation of powers suggests that this school of jurisprudential 
thought has it exactly backward. The substantial recent international relations 
scholarship describes the emergence of transgovermental networks on a global 
scale.148 This work suggests, though has yet to explore, the comparative institutional 
results in any given state. The overwhelming evidence nonetheless suggests that the 
primary comparative beneficiary of the modern disaggregated state has been the 
executive.
 Given this development, transgovernmental globalization violates the core tenets 
of separation of powers doctrine in any given country. These tenets have long made 
separation of powers in some form a predicate for properly functioning democratic 
self-government. First and foremost, separation of powers theory promises balance 
among the major branches of government to prevent a tyrannical accretion of power 
in any one. In the United States, the founding generation prized this facet of the 
doctrine above all else. And though they viewed the “most dangerous” branch as the 
legislature, subsequent history has clearly established the executive as the greatest 
threat to the type of balance that separation of powers presupposes.149 Beyond this, 
the American Founders also believed that separation of powers could facilitate 
146. S. Afr. Const. § 39(1)(b)–(c) 1996.
147. See, e.g., Victoria C. Jackson & Mark V. Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (2d ed. 
2006); Norman Dorsen & Michel Rosenfeld et al., Comparative Constitutionalism (2003).
148. See supra text accompanying footnotes 123–41.
149. See The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Flaherty, supra note 
105, at 1810–39.
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democracy not simply by preserving liberty, but by widely dispersing democratic 
accountability.150 For this reason they ensured that all three branches of government 
had a direct or indirect democratic provenance: the House of Representatives through 
direct elections; the Senate initially through election by the state legislatures; the 
President through the Electoral College; and not least, the judiciary through 
presidential appointment and senatorial approval.151 Of course not all liberal 
democracies, especially in the parliamentary mode, follow the U.S. model in these 
and other specifics. At a more general and no less relevant level, they nonetheless do 
follow the idea that an independent judiciary, itself at least indirectly accountable, 
serves as a check on behalf of individual rights against too great concentrations of 
power in the legislature and executive in the service of energetic government. Not 
only is this idea commonly evident in democratic constitutions, it also is expressed in 
various international human rights instruments.152
 Whether reversing the present trend toward foreign affairs deference will suffice 
to redress the imbalance may be an open question. But to paraphrase Justice Jackson 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, courts concerned with separation of powers 
should be the last, not the first, to bow to the increasingly powerful executive that 
globalization promotes.153
V. JUdiciaL FOREign aFFaiRS aUThORiTy and ThE 9/11 caSES
 The 9/11 cases demonstrate that the Court can still stand up to the President in 
foreign relations when directed by law. Striking enough were the defeats handed the 
executive in a time of threat, fear, and panic. Notable as well were the rejections of 
foreign relations deference across the board, whether involving statutes in Rasul, 
treaties in Hamdan, or the Constitution in Hamdi and Boumediene. The Court 
reasserted itself, moreover, fully aware of the stakes. In each case the executive called 
upon the Court to defer to its foreign relations authority, marshalling the various 
arguments that have gained increasing currency over the past century. Each time the 
Court reverted to its historic form and offered zero deference.
 Yet on closer review, a certain “nuance”154 tempers the Court’s boldness. As many 
commentators have noted, the Court’s post-9/11 decisions reflected deep divisions 
150. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1767–68, 1821–26; Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of 
Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 212 (1994).
151. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, art. I, § 3, cl. 1, art. II, § 1, cl. 2, art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
152. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
153. 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson famously declared:
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for 
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the [rule of] law, and 
that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined to 
pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
154. Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111, 111. 
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among the Justices.155 As others have pointed out, the judgments did not actually 
result in concrete relief for the detainees challenging the government’s policies.156 
More to the point, the Court may not have deferred to the executive’s interpretations, 
but neither did it expressly reject deference per se. In some cases, the majority simply 
ignored the doctrine altogether, leaving it to the dissenting Justices to rail about its 
de facto rejection. In other decisions, the majority followed Youngstown and partly 
rested its determination on Congress’s failure to authorize the executive’s actions.
 These bases are fine as far as they go, but they do not go far enough either to 
afford the 9/11 judgments the security they need to prevent a rollback and still less to 
permit the judiciary to assume its intended role in a globalized age. As an initial 
matter, the Court should face deference head on. And when it does, it should draw 
upon precisely the arguments sketched out in this essay. This means first referring 
back to the Founders’ conception of the Court’s foreign relations role. Yet it should 
also mean looking to current and ongoing developments in international relations 
that challenge the balance among the branches that separation of powers demands. 
What follows suggests how the 9/11 cases did not do this but could have.
 A. Statutes: Rasul
 The first 9/11 case to reach the Supreme Court pitted judicial authority against 
judicial deference with regard to statutory interpretation. Rasul involved the claims 
of fourteen persons captured during the war in Afghanistan and detained at the U.S. 
Naval base at Guantánamo Bay.157 The detainees all sought relief under, among other 
provisions, the federal habeas corpus statute.158 As all sides made clear, the sole 
question came to be whether that statute extended beyond the sovereign territory of 
the United States to Guantánamo.159
 The executive argued a strenuous “no.” The solicitor general primarily based this 
on the Court’s decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager,160 which declined to extend habeas 
jurisdiction to German nationals captured in China during World War II, tried by 
military commission, and held by the U.S. military at a base in Germany.161 Reliance 
on Eisentrager, among other things, would have required the Court to overlook the 
155. See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 51.
156. See John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 573, 575, 579–81 (2006); Mark A. Drumbl, 
Guantánamo, Rasul, and the Twilight of Law, 53 Drake L. Rev. 897, 903–04 (2005).
157. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470–71 (2004).
158. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2243 (2006).
159. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 
WL 943637, at *4, http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-334.pdf 
(“Question: . . . We are here debating the jurisdiction under the Habeas Statute, is that right? [Answer]: 
That’s correct . . . .”); cf. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 489 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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factual differences between the case and the Guantánamo detentions, as well as the 
subsequent interpretations of the habeas statute, arguably keying less on the physical 
location of the petitioner.
 Yet the President’s lawyers did not stop at the merits, or at least the specific 
merits, of the habeas statute. They also sought refuge not just in judicial deference, 
but judicial self-abnegation. In this regard the government first made the ritual 
prefatory contention that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is 
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—
Departments.”162 It continued that during armed hostilities, the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause made the commitment to the executive in particular that much stronger. It 
followed, therefore, that what the Constitution gives to the executive, it takes away 
from the courts. “Exercising jurisdiction over habeas actions filed on behalf of 
Guantanamo detainees would directly interfere with the Executive’s conduct of the 
military campaign against al-Qaeda and its supporters.”163 From here the consequences 
of judicial intervention grew more dire. Entertaining claims from Guantánamo 
would extend jurisdiction of U.S. courts to habeas petitions filed on behalf of aliens 
captured or detained on the battlefield in Afghanistan, or anywhere in the world. 
Simple review of Guantánamo claims would be enough to “thrust the federal courts 
into the extraordinary role of . . . superintending the Executive’s conduct of an armed 
conflict . . . .”164
 Three Justices agreed. Writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, 
Justice Scalia wrote a dissent that devoted even more comparative attention than the 
solicitor general to Eisentrager and arguments that it controlled. The dissent’s coda 
nonetheless made clear that doubts about the courts’ fitness to meddle in foreign 
affairs resonated. The majority’s analysis, Scalia declared, “ought to be unthinkable 
when . . . [it] . . . has a potentially harmful effect upon the Nation’s conduct of a 
war.”165 As if that were not plain enough, he concluded, “[f]or this Court to create 
such a monstrous scheme in time of war, and in frustration of our military 
commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial adventurism of the 
worst sort.”166
 Establishing a pattern for all the 9/11 cases, the majority rejected deference, yet 
did so almost passively. Justice Stevens devoted most of his opinion to the specific 
merits of habeas. Mainly he noted that “[p]etitioners in these cases differ from the 
Eisentrager detainees in important respects.”167 Specifically,
[t]hey are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they 
deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the 
162. Id. at *41 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
163. Id. at *42.
164. Id. at *43.
165. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 476.
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United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less 
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they 
have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises 
exclusive jurisdiction and control.168
Freed from Eisentrager, the Court affirmatively asserted that later habeas decisions 
held “that the prisoner’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the district 
court is not ‘an invariable prerequisite’ to the exercise of district court jurisdiction 
under the federal habeas statute.”169 Instead,
because “the writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks 
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful 
custody,” a district court acts “within [its] respective jurisdiction” within the 
meaning of § 2241 as long as “the custodian can be reached by service of 
process.170
What the Court did not do was acknowledge, much less address, the arguments 
against the courts asserting their authority to interpret statutes that bear a significant 
impact on foreign affairs.
 Yet the Court could have done exactly this. Rather than sidestep the issue, the 
majority first might have reiterated the historical foundations for its intervention. 
Any historical case would have to begin with more than just half the story behind 
separation of powers, let alone the lesser half. At a general, functional level, the 
Founding generation did agree that a key function of dividing government authority 
was the type of efficiency borne of specialization. It followed that the President and 
Congress would be best suited to set policy across the board, including foreign 
relations. It even followed further that the executive would enjoy a comparative 
institutional advantage in responding to national security emergencies. Efficiency, 
however, was not the only nor the primary function envisioned for the doctrine. If 
any one purpose had primacy, it was the prevention of tyranny by preventing too 
great a concentration of power into “the impetuous vortex”171 of any branch of 
government. The executive’s greater decisiveness and f lexibility justifies, among 
other things, its grant of Commander-in-Chief authority, power to recognize 
governments, and further powers that may be implied for these express authorizations. 
But in just the same way, the judiciary, in explicating the law where it has jurisdiction 
and more generally in its role as a neutral arbiter of rights, vests within itself an 
exclusive power to adjudicate the scope of a remedial statute free and clear from any 
special concern for the executive’s views.
 Nor did the Founders tailor these fundamentals for cases involving foreign affairs. 
Instead, they envisaged the courts as key players in the new nation’s quest for 
168. Id.
169. Id. at 478 (quoting Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)).
170. Id. at 478–79 (quoting Braden, 410 U. S. at 494–95).
171. The Federalist No. 48, supra note 149, at 309.
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international respect. In this regard, the well-known case of Little v. Barreme172 
reflects earlier Founding views with specific reference to statutes. In Little, the Court 
considered a capture of a suspected American merchant ship named the Flying Fish 
by the frigate USS Boston during the so-called “quasi-war” with France. An Act of 
Congress authorized the President to instruct naval commanders to inspect and seize 
any suspected vessel sailing to a French port.173 President Adams, however, construed 
the Act to empower him to have American ships seized whether they were going to 
or coming from French ports. Following these orders, the Boston seized the Flying 
Fish, even though it was coming from a French island. Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Marshall had no difficulty holding that the capture was not authorized, 
despite a “construction of the act of congress made by the department to which its 
execution was assigned”—a construction, moreover, “much better calculated to give 
it effect.”174 Where Marshall paused at all, it was to consider whether the Boston’s 
captain might have some sort of immunity from damages for following a presidential 
interpretation, but he declined even to do this.175 Consistent with the Founding, in 
short, the Chief Justice gave zero deference to a federal statute authorizing military 
action and applied during a period of armed hostilities.
 Looking forward, the Little Court might also have predicted out that the bases 
for its foreign affairs role would grow stronger, not weaker. Even under George 
Washington, the eighteenth-century executive was infinitely weaker in relation to 
the other branches than its modern counterpart.176 Even then, this comparative 
weakness did not mean that the Court would grant the President any special leeway 
when it determined that a matter fell within the judicial power. As Little indicates, 
the judiciary instead would accord the executive zero deference in statutory 
interpretation, even when the statute dealt with what was then the nation’s only real 
instrument of national defense, the U.S. Navy, in an armed naval conflict.
 Today the executive’s comparative power has increased exponentially, making the 
prima facie case for a strong judicial check correspondingly stronger. Many of the 
domestic sources for increased presidential power mentioned as long ago as Youngstown 
continue to f lourish, including the concentration of authority in a single head, access 
to media, and the role of the President as head of his or her party.177 Add to this the 
further effects of foreign relations. Globalization today works to comparatively 
enhance executive authority throughout the world, including the United States. This 
equation gains a multiplier effect once national security becomes the occasion for 
executives around the world to cooperate. The facts of Rasul itself provide a telling 
172. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
173. An Act Further to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Between the United States and France, and the 
Dependencies Thereof, 1 Stat. 578 (expired), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage? 
collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=701.
174. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 178.
175. Id. at 179.
176. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1810–28.
177. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952).
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illustration. There, the armed forces of the United States, in the course of a war 
given only the most general authorization by Congress, teamed up with irregular 
insurgent forces within Afghanistan to detain hundreds of enemy combatants where 
the likelihood of misidentification was substantial.178 This assertion of joint executive 
authority provides all the more reason for the judiciary to assert its checking function 
against the concentration of too much power in any single branch. The conclusion 
follows with that much greater force when the specific check is the judiciary’s core 
role of interpreting statutes that set forth remedies for the violation of fundamental 
rights. Otherwise, the central purpose underlying separation of powers would survive 
merely at the sufferance of the President’s claims in foreign affairs.
 B. Treaties: Hamdan
 Hamdan repeated the story told in Rasul, only this time with regard to treaties. 
In particular, the contest between judicial and executive interpretation turned on the 
Third Geneva Convention as incorporated into domestic law by the UCMJ. This 
issue arose in light of President George W. Bush’s decision to try certain Guantánamo 
detainees in special military commissions rather than in civilian courts or courts-
martial. Among the first slated to go on trial was Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was 
seized in Afghanistan, turned over to the U.S. military, and ultimately charged with 
“conspiracy ‘to commit offenses . . . triable by military commission,’” namely 
“attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; 
and terrorism.”179 Thanks to Rasul, Hamdan countered with a habeas petition that 
among other things claimed that the commissions violated basic procedural 
protections as set forth in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
 The executive disagreed, strongly. The first argument asserted that any treaty 
claim that Hamdan might have was not justiciable. On the executive’s view, the 
Geneva Conventions did not create judicially enforceable remedies. Relying in part 
on Eisentrager, the President’s lawyers contended that the Conventions were properly 
read as leaving enforcement to diplomatic representations between governments 
instead of by domestic courts.180 On this point the Court in Hamdan was bound, not 
just because of its own ostensible precedent in Eisentrager, but because of the deference 
it owed the executive in treaty interpretation:
178. Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Policy and Research has done extensive research and analysis 
concerning the detainees held in Guantánamo based upon evidence presented at proceedings before the 
Combat Status Review Tribunals, which are the bodies set up to establish that those individuals held in 
detention qualify as “unlawful enemy combatants.” The reports that the center has issued have indicated 
that the evidence for this designation is meager or non existent in the vast majority of instances. See 
Mark Denbeaux et al., Seton Hall Law Ctr. for Policy and Research, The Meaning of 
“Battlefield”: An Analysis of the Government’s Representations of “Battlefield” Capture 
and “Recidivism” of the Guantánamo Detainees 2 (Dec. 10, 2007), http://law.shu.edu/
publications/guantanamoReports/meaning_of_battlefield_final_121007.pdf.
179. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566, 605 (2006) (quoting Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 65a, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184)).
180. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 30–34.
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As this Court noted in Eisentrager, a contrary construction of the Geneva 
Convention would severely encumber the President’s authority as Commander 
in Chief. Indeed, petitioner’s argument suggests that the hundreds of 
thousands of POWs held by the United States in this country during World 
War II were entitled to enforce the 1929 version of the Convention through 
private legal actions in our courts. The Executive Branch’s construction of 
the Convention avoids such absurd consequences and is entitled to “great 
weight.”181
With the Court’s reading of the treaty established, the President argued further that 
no domestic enactment rendered Geneva Convention rights judicially enforceable, 
including the UCMJ and the Habeas Act.182
 Next, the President argued that “[e]ven if the Geneva Convention were judicially 
enforceable, it is inapplicable to the ongoing conflict with al Qaeda.”183 This result 
followed thanks to a Catch-22 created by his interpretation of the Convention. On 
one hand, “[t]he President has determined that the Geneva Convention does not 
‘apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the 
world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to 
[the Convention].’”184 Since al-Qaeda was a terrorist organization, rather than a 
sovereign state capable of signing and ratifying the treaty, the President further 
determined that neither al-Qaeda nor its members could claim the protections the 
treaty provided. Yet on the other hand, the provision that appeared to address 
conf licts involving non-state actors did not do so either. Or so the President 
determined. As the solicitor general also noted:
“Pursuant to [his] authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive of 
the United States,” the President has “accept[ed] the legal conclusion of the 
Department of Justice . . . that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply  
to . . . al Qaeda . . . detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant 
conf licts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to 
‘armed conflict not of an international character.’”185
These particular executive interpretations, if anything, demanded even greater 
deference. The executive’s initial claim was that they were beyond the judicial review 
at all. This somewhat bold contention rested variously on the President’s war powers, 
on general foreign affairs authority, and on analogies to executive authority to 
recognize governments and determine when governments have ratified treaties.186 
Less bold, but still sweeping, the President contended that even if courts could review 
181. Id. at 34 (citation omitted); see United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); Sumitomo Shoji Am., 
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982).
182. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 716–17.
183. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 37.
184. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 38.
185. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 718 (citation omitted).
186. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 37–38.
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these determinations, “the standard of review would surely be extraordinarily 
deferential to the President.”187
 As in Rasul, arguments for self-abnegation registered among certain Justices in 
dissent. Justice Thomas, writing for Justices Scalia and Alito, agreed on the merits 
that Eisentrager settled whether the Geneva Conventions provided for domestic 
judicial remedies.188 He also agreed that even if the Court’s precedent hadn’t settled 
the matter, a fresh review of the treaty would lead to the same conclusion.189 Finally, 
the dissent accepted the government’s argument that the UCMJ did not render the 
Convention’s provisions judicially enforceable.190 Justice Thomas recorded even 
stronger agreement with the executive on deference. As he put it:
Under this Court’s precedents, “the meaning attributed to treaty provisions 
by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement 
is entitled to great weight.” Our duty to defer to the President’s understanding of 
the provision at issue here is only heightened by the fact that he is acting pursuant to 
his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and by the fact that the 
subject matter of Common Article 3 calls for a judgment about the nature 
and character of an armed conflict.191
 Once again, the majority rejected the executive’s views, though, once more, not 
as such. In a lengthy opinion, Justice Stevens, among other things, made clear that 
the President’s military tribunals violated Hamdan’s rights under Common Article 3 
as incorporated by the UCMJ. To get to this conclusion, the majority first rejected 
the argument that Eisentrager controlled and, in particular, Eisentrager’s observation 
that the Geneva Conventions did not confer a right to enforce its provisions in 
domestic courts. The Court nonetheless assumed without deciding that the 
Conventions did not act as an independent source of domestic law binding the 
government and conferring enforceable rights.192 The rights that the Conventions set 
forth, however, were part of the customary international laws of war, and the Court 
interpreted the UCMJ as conditioning the authority to create military commissions 
on compliance with that body of law.193
187. Id. at 38.
188. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 716–17 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488–89 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 717–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 678, 718–19.
191. Id. at 718–19 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
192. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628. Even here, however, the Court dropped a “but see” footnote referencing a 
brief submitted by the late Louis Henkin and other law professors noting that the International 
Committee of the Red Cross had early on indicated that “[i]t should be possible in States which are 
parties to the Convention . . . for the rules of the Convention . . . to be evoked before an appropriate 
national court by the protected person who has suffered a violation.” Id. at 628 n.58.
193. Id. at 628.
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 This reasoning meant the Court had to face the Convention directly. Here the 
majority quickly passed by the President’s argument that the Convention applied 
only to forces fighting for “High Contracting Parties” under Article 2 and that 
al-Qaeda did not qualify. “We need not decide the merits of this argument because 
there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the 
relevant conflict is not one between signatories”—Common Article 3.194 The Court 
made this determination by properly rejecting an argument accepted by the D.C. 
Circuit and maintained by the executive. That position read the Article’s introductory 
wording, which states that it applies to “armed conf lict not of an international 
character,” as not covering conflict with al-Qaeda given that the global “War on 
Terrorism” clearly crosses national borders.195 Justice Stevens rejected this reasoning 
on several bases. First, he noted that the structure of the Conventions was best 
understood as providing a high level of protection for combatants of classical state vs. 
state conflicts, yet in addition accorded minimum fundamental rights for participants 
in conflicts falling short of traditional wars.196 Second, the majority noted that the 
use of the term “international” was a term of art literally applying to actions between 
nation states. It followed that conf lict between the United States and a terrorist 
organization was not of an “international character” in this sense. 197 Finally, the 
Court relied on the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Commentaries, 
which confirmed the Court’s interpretation.198
 Having concluded, contrary to the executive, that Common Article 3 applied, 
the Court found a violation, and Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, found 
another. The majority held that the military commissions proposed by President 
Bush ran afoul of the provision’s requirement that detainees receive sentences only 
from “a regularly constituted court.”199 The Court reasoned that the commissions 
were not regularly constituted on the strength of its conclusion that the UCMJ 
prohibited them on the record before it, which was also a discrete and independent 
basis for the Court’s judgment. Under Article 36(b) of the UCMJ “all rules and 
regulations” that the President may prescribe for military courts “shall be uniform 
insofar as is practicable.”200 On the majority’s view, this requirement meant that the 
procedures for courts martial and commissions had to be uniform unless the President 
194. Id. at 629.
195. Id. at 718, 724 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316).
196. Id. at 562.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 619–20.
199. Id. at 630, 631–33. As the Court points out, Article 3(1)(d) prohibits “the passing of sentences and the 
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Id. at 
630 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, ¶ 1(d), Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316).
200. 10 U.S.C. § 836, art. 36(b) (2006).
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made some showing that the substantial divergence between the two was objectively 
impracticable. Since the President did not, the commissions were unauthorized under 
the UCMJ.201 The Court took this position, moreover, notwithstanding the 
President’s strenuous statutory argument that Article 36(a) merely set out a subjective 
standard to be determined by the President, an argument to which the majority 
accorded deference.202 Given its reading of the statute, it followed that unauthorized 
commissions could not be considered regularly constituted for the purposes of the 
Convention.203
 Justice Stevens found one more violation of Common Article 3, but here he lost 
Justice Kennedy and thus the majority. Where they parted company turned on 
Common Article 3’s additional requirement that even regularly constituted courts 
must afford “all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.”204 Stevens, now writing for only Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, determined that the commissions lacked a number of indispensable 
procedures, including the right to be tried in one’s presence and the right to be 
apprised of all incriminating evidence.205 Justice Kennedy did not necessarily disagree 
at the first instance. He nonetheless expressed the belief that the appellate review 
201. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620–25.
202. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 44–45.
203. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632.
204. Common Article 3 reads, in full:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to 
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
 1.  Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end 
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
  (a)  Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture;
  (b)  Taking of hostages;
  (c)  Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment;
  (d)  The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.
 2.  The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial 
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may 
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, ¶¶ 1–2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316.
205. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633, 634–35 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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provided for commission judgments would cure any problems created by the lack of 
essential procedural safeguards at the trial level.206 Once more, both the Stevens 
plurality and the Kennedy opinion rejected a contrary reading of the treaty put 
forward by the executive.207 Once again, however, they simply set out their legal 
reasoning rather than rejecting deference expressly.
 Echoing Rasul, this lost opportunity counts against Hamdan, however laudable 
the decision is generally. Perhaps even more richly than with statutes, the Founding 
provides the Court with a compelling basis to justify its independent review of treaty 
provisions in the face of insistent constructions put forth by the President. More 
generally, the same functional commitments apply as fully with international 
agreements as they do statutes. Certainly, efficiency—or as Hamilton put it, “secrecy 
and dispatch”—applied to the making of treaties in particular. For this reason the 
Convention transferred the power to negotiate treaties from the Senate to the 
President, and the too-large House was to get out of the process altogether. Yet 
balance still remained a primary goal. To further this purpose, the Founders, among 
other things, included the requirement that two-thirds of the senators present 
approve before a treaty could go into effect. Despite what might be thought today, 
this supermajority proviso did not have much to do with addressing an ostensible 
“democratic deficit” left by excluding the House. Rather, it had nearly everything to 
do with the fear that the President could combine with a regional block of senators to 
undermine the rights and interests of a particular part of the country—in particular, 
the northeastern states’ using their majority to protect their fishing rights in the 
Atlantic at the expense of giving away navigation rights on the Mississippi, which 
were essential to the prosperity of the growing Southwest. In these ways, the 
Founding commitment to separation of powers to prevent a tyrannical accretion of 
power in the government was both manifest and self-conscious in a core area of 
foreign affairs.208
 The same concern applies more specifically to the role of the courts. One of the 
central problems leading to the Federal Convention was the failure of the U.S. 
government in maintaining its treaty commitments. In particular, the new nation 
could not enforce key undertakings in the 1783 Treaty of Paris with the United 
Kingdom that ended the Revolution. Of special concern were the American 
undertakings first to insure compensation for loyalists whose property had been 
confiscated during the war and, second, to prevent the states from impeding British 
creditors from making good on their valid claims. With no direct power to legislate, 
the national government had to rely on the states, many of which blithely ignored the 
obligation to pass any measures protecting such unpopular groups. The solution was 
the Supremacy Clause’s provision making treaties “the supreme Law of the Land,” 
or, in modern parlance, “self-executing.”209 The no less manifest corollary to this 
206. Id. at 636, 653–55 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 49–50.
208. See Flaherty, supra note 117, at 2118.
209. Id. at 2120–51.
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decision was that it would fall to the courts, above all the federal courts, to make 
good on individuals’ treaty claims when government officials would not. In the first 
instance, resistance came, as expected, from state officials leading to several landmark 
Supreme Court decisions.210 As professor Sloss has shown, it also came from the 
federal executive, and when it did, the Justices gave no additional weight to the 
President’s views anymore than it did to those of state officials.211
 Looking forward, the effects of globalization also apply as fully with regard to 
treaties as statutes; perhaps more so. First, again as a general matter, the ties that 
executives around the world have been able to forge have outstripped those made by 
their legislative and judicial counterparts. This broad pattern would be reason enough 
for courts to maintain their authority because rather than despite particular cases 
having foreign relations implications. For this reason, judicial authority to interpret 
treaties becomes even more important insofar as this source of law usually deals with 
foreign relations matters more directly and more often than with statutes and because, 
in the international context, agreements frequently furnish the primary check on 
executive action. The stakes become only that much higher when national security 
and individual rights are implicated.
 As with Rasul, Hamdan provides a telling illustration. There, executive officials 
from different states worked together outside the usual checks of domestic law to 
capture an individual who would be indefinitely detained and made subject to an 
attempted trial before an irregular court. Hamdan himself landed in Guantánamo 
after being captured by Afghan militia forces, who then turned him over to the U.S. 
military. The justification for deeming the resulting detention and trial outside the 
usual checks was that the capture took place in the course of a war. Yet it is exactly 
this claim that shows the dangers of globalization in the national security context. 
First, while the war in Afghanistan might end, captures in the new “War on Terror” 
may continue as long as the threat of terrorism exists, which is to say, without end. 
To face this threat, executives around the world will continue to cooperate to detain 
suspected terrorists and place them in specialized courts wherever and whenever they 
can find them. In this context, the primary source for the rule of law comes from 
treaties such as the Geneva Conventions. Given this role, it would come as no surprise 
that an executive such as that which existed in the Bush administration would 
interpret the resulting strictures either as not applicable or not meaningful. It should, 
however, be shocking for the courts to cede their authority to interpret treaties as any 
other body of law. To do so would be to take one of the quickest paths to undermine 
separation of powers given the realities of modern international relations.
210. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (discussing a treaty between Great Britain and the 
United States regarding collection of debts on foreign soil and a state legislature’s failure to collect a 
debt on behalf of Great Britain); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (establishing 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state supreme court decisions and adjudicating a land 
title dispute between the estate of a British citizen and a citizen of the State of Virginia).
211. Sloss, supra note 35, at 498–99.
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 C. Constitution: Hamdi
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,212 which was decided between Rasul and Hamdan, represents 
a culmination of all three cases by most directly addressing the Constitution. The 
case arose when Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured by members of the 
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. military.213 Unlike 
Rasul, he was transferred from Guantánamo to a naval brig within the United States 
once the government discovered that he was a U.S. citizen. Like Rasul, however, 
Hamdi was designated an “enemy combatant” and so subject to indefinite detention. 
Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming, among other 
things, that he had a right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to contest 
the factual basis for his detention through a hearing.214 In the course of its response, 
the executive attached a declaration from Michael Mobbs, special advisor to the 
under secretary of defense for policy, which asserted that Hamdi had been affiliated 
with a Taliban military unit, had remained with it after the attacks of 9/11, and had 
been with the unit when it surrendered to the Northern Alliance, at which point he 
surrendered his Kalishnikov assault rif le.215
 The Court granted certiorari on two potentially constitutional questions. The 
first dealt with Hamdi’s challenge to the executive’s authority to detain citizens as 
“enemy combatants.” A majority held that the detention was authorized. Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion, however, relied on Authorization of the Use of Military 
Force (AUMF). For this reason, the plurality did not have to address the executive’s 
argument “that no explicit congressional authorization is required, because the 
Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the 
Constitution.”216 With detention established, there remained the second question: 
“What process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant 
status?”217 Here the Court did grapple with the constitutional issue and, with it, the 
question of judicial deference.
 As ever, the President’s lawyers argued against the courts having any meaningful 
role. In Rasul, that meant reading a statute consistent with the executive’s concerns 
given its constitutional role in foreign relations. In Hamdan, the argument went 
further to assert that the courts should bow to the President’s interpretation of treaties 
given the President’s greater ostensible expertise in dealing with this type of law. 
With Hamdi, the executive rang still another change. Here the White House argued 
that the Constitution itself acknowledged the President’s greater institutional capacity 
in foreign affairs, especially in the context of national security. In the circumstances, 
two arguments followed. First, the President alone had ample authority to detain 
212. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
213. Id. at 510 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
214. Id. at 510–11.
215. Id. at 512–13.
216. Id. at 516.
217. Id. at 524.
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Hamdi and therefore anyone else he deemed in some way associated with the 9/11 
attacks. Second, separation of powers principles meant that the courts had to accept 
the President’s determination of who constituted an “enemy combatant.”
 The President’s first claim came more at the expense of Congress than the courts. 
As the solicitor general put it, it was simply “incorrect” that Congress alone had the 
power to authorize the detention of captured enemy combatant who is an American 
citizen.218 Rather, “[e]specially in the case of foreign attack, the President’s authority 
to wage war is not dependent on ‘any special legislative authority.’”219 In fairness, the 
President’s legal team was not so bold as to argue superior institutional capacity in 
interpreting the Constitution, which would have been a bold (though not 
unprecedented) argument in light of Marbury. In this sense, the executive’s contention 
did not go as far as it did in Hamdan concerning treaties or arguably Rasul with regard 
to statutes. The President quickly went on to point out that Congress had affirmed 
his authority to detain in any case through the AUMF.220 Even so, the argument for 
executive authority to detain free and clear of Congress had been asserted.
 The second main claim took aim at the judiciary more directly and asserted that 
separation of powers principles compelled it to defer to the executive’s factual 
determinations plain and simple. The solicitor general reminded the Court that it 
had observed that “‘courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the 
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs,’” and further that 
“‘[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper 
subjects for judicial intervention.’”221 The basis for judicial restraint rested in 
institutional capacity, namely the military’s “unmatched vantage point from which to 
learn about the enemy and make judgments as to whether those seized during a 
conflict are friend or foe.”222 The President’s lawyers did make the apparent concession 
that while factual determinations muted judicial review, a habeas challenge would 
give the courts the opportunity to consider challenges concerning the executive’s 
authority to act. As they put it, “[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited 
institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military decisionmaking in connection 
with an ongoing conflict may well limit courts to the consideration of legal attacks 
on the detention of captured enemy combatants . . . .”223 Of course, in Rasul and 
Hamdan the executive went on to argue that the President’s legal determinations also 
commanded deference.
 Once more, the executive’s arguments met with some support on the Court, 
though only in dissent and, in this instance, only in the lone effort of Justice Thomas. 
The opinion nonetheless sets out the case for judicial deference to the executive in 
218. Brief for the Respondents at 19, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
219. Id. (quoting The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862)).
220. Id. at 20.
221. Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 26.
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almost its purest form. Thomas argued that, once authorized by the Constitution or 
Congress to take a particular action dealing with national security, the President 
may make the factual determinations necessary to take that action free and clear of 
any oversight by the courts—all on grounds of institutional capacity. As he made the 
point: “This detention falls squarely within the Federal Government’s war powers, 
and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.”224 The dissent 
came to this conclusion by focusing entirely on the capabilities of the “unitary 
executive” in foreign affairs. Here Justice Thomas proceeded from the well-worn 
premise that the Constitution’s structure aimed to create an energetic executive 
ref lecting the “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” that characterizes an 
individual rather than a group.225 “These structural advantages are most important in 
the national-security and foreign-affairs contexts.”226 Congress, Thomas conceded, 
does have an important role in these realms. “But,” he added, “it is crucial to recognize 
that judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of vesting primary 
responsibility in a unitary Executive.”227
 Bolstering this conclusion, according to Thomas, is the judiciary’s own and abject 
lack of expertise in these areas. First, “courts simply lack the relevant information 
and expertise to second-guess determinations made by the President based on 
information properly withheld.”228 Second, determining what information may be 
safely made public is simply too “delicate [and] complex” a matter for courts.229 
Finally, the Court itself has ostensibly recognized the primacy of the political 
branches in foreign and national security affairs. Unconsidered in this analysis was 
any special capacities of the courts.230 The dissent did not pause to consider the 
structural counterpoint that an independent judiciary served to check the political 
branches, especially when individual liberty was at stake. Nor did it discuss the 
Court’s own expertise in making individual factual determinations concerning 
individual deprivation of liberty. Still less did it talk about the Court’s capacity to 
make such determinations against different levels of proof as set out either by the 
Constitution or statute.
 These tasks would mainly fall to Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, announcing 
the judgment that the federal courts did have substantive oversight power over the 
decision to detain persons as “enemy combatants.” Justice O’Connor came to the case 
with her well-known penchant to struggle with both sides of a question and split the 
224. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 581 (quoting The Federalist No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961)).
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 582.
228. Id. at 583.
229. Id. (citation omitted). 
230. Id.
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difference with some form of balancing test.231 It therefore came as no surprise that 
she did exactly that here. As she said at the outset of her analysis, “It is beyond 
question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case.”232
 On one side, the O’Connor plurality does not ignore either the executive’s 
interests or its institutional advantages. In particular, the opinion noted that “weighty 
and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought 
with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States.”233 It 
also took as a given the Constitution’s assignment of military decisionmaking and 
policy to the President and Congress. “Without doubt,” Justice O’Connor observed, 
“our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of war-making belong in the 
hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making 
them.”234 Article II concerns, and to some extent Article I considerations as well, had 
to be taken into account.
 Yet in stark contrast to the Thomas dissent, the O’Connor opinion saw another 
side as well. Justice O’Connor bookended her discussion of the military perspective 
by looking at the constitutional claims of detainees and the role of the judiciary in 
safeguarding them. The claims rested squarely on Fifth Amendment Due Process. 
The plurality acknowledged that the right at stake “is the most elemental of liberty 
interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own 
government.”235 Nor did the wartime setting change the reality that physical detention 
affected this interest.236 To the contrary, on that point O’Connor noted a darker side 
to the institutional capacity of the executive. “History and common sense,” she 
opined, “teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to 
become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present [a national 
security] threat.”237
 First and foremost the check against such potential abuse is “an impartial 
adjudicator.”238 And not just any impartial adjudicator, but in this instance the federal 
courts. As the plurality declared:
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers 
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts . . . . Indeed, 
the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case 
231. Justice O’Connor, for example, long advocated an “undue burden” test that fell between strict scrutiny 
and rational relationship analysis for abortion cases. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
871–74 (1992). Likewise, in the affirmative action context, while she asserted a strict scrutiny standard, 
she was at pains to indicate that the test would not be as “fatal” to government measures as generally 
understood. Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
232. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
233. Id. at 531.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 529.
236. Id. at 530.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 535.
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and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot 
be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach 
serves only to condense power into a single branch of government.239
The conclusion followed further given the judiciary’s role as guardian of fundamental 
rights. As O’Connor put it, “Whatever power the United States Constitution 
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three 
branches when individual liberties are at stake.”240 Any other conclusion would “turn 
our system of checks and balances on its head.”241
 All that said, the plurality’s specific cash-out of these principles might have done 
more to fit the reality to the rhetoric. Under the plurality’s analysis, the balance 
between the Bill of Rights and Article III on the one hand, and Article II on the 
other, would be mediated by Mathews v. Eldridge,242 a case usually associated with 
the denial of government entitlement benefits.243 In this setting, a detainee could get 
notice of the factual basis for the detention; could have a hearing to rebut that factual 
basis; and at some point could have a lawyer. These specific safeguards may not quite 
match the plurality’s high-flying analysis. That analysis, however, matters insofar as 
it repudiated judicial deference when constitutional liberties are at stake. It would fall 
to Justice Scalia in dissent to point to a better way forward. Joined by Justice Stevens, 
the dissent argued that the government had only two options to get around Hamdi’s 
habeas petition: it could charge him with treason (or some other similarly grave 
crime), or it could seek to have Congress suspend the habeas option.244 No less 
importantly, the grounds for Scalia’s position rested squarely on Founding notions of 
separation of powers. The Justice’s stance opposing the executive in favor of liberty 
might at first blush appear out of character,245 doubly so in light of his odd pairing 
with Justice Stevens. The anomaly may not be that much more apparent than real, 
but the reality of Scalia’s originalist approach does not lead to uniformly statist 
results. Even under his narrow approach to history, the Justice has been known to 
uphold individual rights against executive claims.246 The Hamdi dissent fits in just 
this discrete area. To this extent, the Justice may rightfully claim adherence to 
239. Id. at 535–36.
240. Id. at 536.
241. See id. at 536–37.
242. Id. at 529.
243. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
244. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. Notably, Justice Scalia voted to uphold the executive’s actions. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488–89 
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 669–70 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).
246. Justice Scalia, for example, has applied this approach when interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of a person’s right to confront witnesses against him or her. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 
353, 359–61 (2008). He has taken much the same approach in the Fourth Amendment context. See 
Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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principled interpretation that trumps political inclination. Of even greater import is 
that, more than the plurality, this dissent provides a foundation on which to build a 
better constitutional analysis in the post-9/11 context.
 That foundation rests first on the dissent’s result. The result limits the executive’s 
options far more severely than the Mathews balancing test. At the end of the day, 
that test as applied to Hamdi himself yielded no more than the right to notice, a 
hearing, and at some point, counsel. For Scalia, the Constitution’s concern for basic 
rights commands “that Hamdi is entitled to a habeas decree requiring his release 
unless (1) criminal proceedings [most obviously for treason] are promptly brought, or 
(2) Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus.”247 Since neither alternative 
had occurred, Hamdi should have been held no longer.
 Of greater significance is Scalia’s reasoning. More fully than the plurality, the 
dissent rehabilitates the Constitution’s concern for individual liberty even in time of 
national danger. It resurrects this historic commitment, moreover, with a near 
complete reliance on history. Hamdi gives Scalia a classic opportunity to apply his 
theory that the Constitution’s protection of rights was, for the most part, originally 
understood to incorporate those protections as manifested in the common law at the 
time of the Founding. This idea applies with special force when attached to a 
particular text and with greater force still to habeas corpus since that is “the only 
common-law writ to be explicitly mentioned [in the Constitution.]”248 Most of the 
dissent, therefore, discusses the writ’s history. It conducts a 250-year excursion 
through English history, demonstrating how habeas became the critical check on the 
English monarch’s attempts to incarcerate individuals outside the law.249 It provides 
liberal quotations from William Blackstone demonstrating the importance of habeas, 
both in itself and to the greater idea of due process, on the eve of the American 
Revolution.250 It also notes the importance of Blackstone and the common law 
tradition to the Founders.251 Nor does Scalia stop here. He further considers the 
possibility that criminal charges or legislative suspension of habeas may not have 
been the only possibilities during times of national crisis. Starting with seventeenth-
century England and eighteenth-century America, he concludes no other alternative 
existed.252 With respect to the United States, the dissent moves beyond the original 
understanding and demonstrates that post-ratification custom maintained these 
initial commitments.253
 This is not to say that Scalia’s history is beyond reproach. On one hand, it may be 
criticized as according habeas too broad an application. As a matter of eighteenth-
247. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 558.
249. Id. at 554–58.
250. Id. at 555, 561–62.
251. Id. at 555, 578–79.
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century common law, it is less than clear that the writ ran to persons captured or held 
outside the territorial realm of Great Britain, Ireland, or the monarch’s dominions. If 
so, the application of the right outside the United States would be problematic. On 
the other hand, the dissent may be subjected to even greater criticism for its 
narrowness. Like much of Scalia’s constitutional history, the Hamdi dissent has a 
distinctly wooden, law-office quality.254 It mainly pours over English and American 
precedent and commentary in painstaking detail in a quest to discern the precise 
contours of habeas and the treason doctrine. This rigor in itself is not a bad thing. It 
should not, however, be to the exclusion of the larger context in which habeas 
developed, the possibility that the Founders’ reception of these doctrines may not 
have been precise, or that the American understanding may (or may not) have been 
even broader. That said, the dissent does end with a powerful coda suggesting that 
the Founders’ purpose was not simply to replicate common law doctrine but to do so 
precisely because they understood the threat to fundamental rights that times of 
national crises entailed:
The Founders well understood the difficult tradeoff between safety and 
freedom. “Safety from external danger,” Hamilton declared, “is the most 
powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, 
after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and 
property incident to war; the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state 
of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort 
for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their 
civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, at length, become willing to 
run the risk of being less free.” The Founders warned us about the risk, and 
equipped us with a Constitution designed to deal with it. Many think it not 
only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give way to security in times of 
national crisis—that, at the extremes of military exigency, inter arma silent 
leges. Whatever the general merits of the view that war silences law or 
modulates its voice, that view has no place in the interpretation and application 
of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in a manner that 
accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it.255
This final f lourish should serve as a double reminder. Whatever cavils one might 
have, it is Justice Scalia, more than any of his colleagues, who marshals our founding 
history in service of a proper framework for considering the roles of the executive and 
judiciary in light of 9/11. Any consideration of that history indicates that a concern 
for judicial protection of fundamental liberty is at a minimum as important as any 
solicitude for the executive and national security.
 Even then, the dissent has it only half-right. As this article has sought to 
demonstrate, subsequent history has served merely to make these founding concerns 
254. Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution indicated a separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers obvious 
to the modern observer), with Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1768–71 (arguing that outside core meanings 
of those powers, that constitution as well as others showed surprising disagreement about the details of 
separation of powers).
255. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 578–79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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greater. The executive has become infinitely greater than anything the Founders could 
have envisioned, especially in light of the New Deal and the emergence of the modern 
national security state. Beyond all of this, however, is the more recent development of 
globalization, of which countering terrorism is part.256 To fully play its assigned role, 
the courts should not just restore the founding concern for fundamental rights to their 
analysis, nor simply note that the modern executive has grown so powerful that it puts 
pressure on any original conception of a balance among the branches. Justices and 
judges should also make explicit that foreign relations in the twenty-first century does 
not merely reveal new threats to the nation’s external security but furnishes the 
executive with even greater means to act as an institution that has a tendency to 
destroy [a nation’s] civil and political rights.257 To date, the Supreme Court has done a 
surprisingly good job of resisting calls for deference to the executive. With a deeper 
understanding of the past and the present, it could do better.
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 Over two-hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson anticipated concern about the 
relevance of a constitution that outlived the generation that created it.258 His concern 
could only have grown that much greater at the prospect of an eighteenth-century 
framework in a twenty-first-century world. To judge from the many opinions and 
articles grappling with its implications, globalization highlights Jefferson’s concerns 
about an antique constitution speaking to a far different era as perhaps no other 
modern development could.
 Yet if deference is any indication, at least separation of powers demonstrates the 
Constitution’s vitality, especially in foreign relations. Contrary to what some 
formalists aver, the Constitution’s founders did not work through the concept so 
thoroughly or precisely as to effectively freeze their applications to the circumstances 
of the late 1700s. Yet neither is separation of powers so general that it is merely an 
invitation to struggle and nothing more. Rather, text, structure, and history yield a 
structural approach to a separation of powers that spoke to its own day but which 
remains no less germane to ours. At the Founding, considerations of efficiency led to 
an executive far more powerful than any American predecessor, yet also one severely 
constrained by the imperatives of balance and joint accountability. Today globalization 
in its transgovernmental form cuts against executive pretensions even further. At 
least with regard to treaty interpretation, the phenomenon does not particularly add 
to the executive’s traditional claims based on expertise, claims which did not go 
especially far in the early republic. By contrast, globalization places enormous pressure 
on the value of balance in particular. It follows that there is even less reason for the 
courts to defer to the executive now than before—and nowhere less so than in foreign 
relations.
256. See supra Part IV.
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